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545 
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE1: COPYRIGHT 
LAW CONFRONTS THE INFORMATION AGE IN 
NEW YORK TIMES V. TASINI2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Marshall McLuhan theorized that the medium is the message; that 
society is shaped by the way in which we communicate rather than by 
what we are communicating.3  The Internet,4 the emerging online 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE (Jerome 
Agel Coordinator, Bantam Books 1967).  See infra note 3. 
 2. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing publishers to 
place freelance articles in electronic databases under the revision privilege in §201(c) of the 
Copyright Act), rev’d, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999); Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding publishers cannot place freelance articles in electronic databases because 
databases containing individual articles from periodicals do not constitute revisions under §201(c)), 
aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding articles 
republished in electronic databases are not part of, nor revisions, of periodicals and cannot be re-
licensed by periodical publishers without the author’s consent). 
 3. See MCLUHAN, supra note 1 (concluding that since the rise of man, society has been 
shaped by the manner in which they communicate).  The development of the spoken word allowed 
the transfer of ideas among primitive man; the development of the written word allowed records to 
be kept and knowledge to be transferred among man’s contemporaries as well as future generations; 
Gutenberg’s printing press disseminated the written word to the masses encouraging academia and 
debate; the development of telephones and radios drastically reduced geographic barriers to 
communication and allowed information to be quickly spread across the globe; and television and 
new technologies will transform the world to a “global village” where everyone on the planet is 
inextricably connected to each other as if we lived in the same village in primitive Africa.  Id.  
Throughout these changes, the essence of communications has remained fundamentally the same, 
focusing on agriculture, commerce, war, etc., yet society has developed as a result in the changes in 
the way that we communicate.  Id.  See also MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS, THE 
GLOBAL VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21st CENTURY (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1989) (discussing the effects of modern media on society). 
 4. The Internet began as “ARPANET,” an experimental project of the Advanced Research 
Project Agency.  Needham J. Boddie et al., A Review of Copyright and the Internet, 20 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 193, 195 (1998).  The Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) developed 
ARPANET to link computers owned by military contractors with university laboratories conducting 
defense related research.  Id.  As the number of networks increased, DARPA developed rules and 
procedures, called protocols, for sending and receiving data within the networks.  Id.  As the 
networks grew in size the networks as a whole came to be known as the “DARPA Internet” which 
was subsequently shortened just to Internet.  Id.  “The Internet today is a worldwide entity whose 
nature cannot be easily or simply defined.  Id.  From a technical definition, the Internet is the set of 
all interconnected ‘IP networks’ – the collection of several thousand local, regional, and global 
1
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community, and unprecedented access to information via the 
“information superhighway” are confirming McLuhan’s hypothesis.5  
Today, it is the norm to have a digital6 telephone in your pocket, not 
only capable of instantly contacting anyone in the world, but also 
capable of connecting to the Internet to send and receive e-mail, 
download stock quotes, and check to see what time a movie is playing.7  
Digital communication is revolutionizing the world in which we live.8 
                                                                                                                                 
computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP Internetworking Protocol suite. . . .” 
DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (McGraw-Hill 1994).  More simply, 
the Internet is millions of computers in schools, universities, corporations, homes, and other 
organizations tied together via telephone lines.  David Bruning, Blasting Along the InfoBahn, 
ASTRONOMY, June 1995, at 76.  “The Internet enables users to share files, search for information, 
send electronic mail, and log onto remote computers.  But it isn’t a program or even a particular 
computer resource.  It remains only a means to link computer users together.”  Id. 
 5. See Dom F. Atteritano, Note, The Growing Financial Pie of Online Publications: Tasini’s 
New-Use Analysis Leaves Freelance Authors Less than Crumbs, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 378 
(1998) (arguing the same).  The term “information superhighway” was coined in 1978 by Mr. 
Albert Gore, and is used interchangeably with the terms “electronic highway” and “National 
Information Infrastructure.”  Mark L. Gordon & Diana J. P. McKensie, A Lawyer’s Roadmap of the 
Information Superhighway, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 179 (1995).  The 
“information superhighway” is the popular term used to describe a vision of a worldwide 
communications network, similar to what the Internet is today.  Id. at 179 n.2 (citing Daniel Pearl, 
Colliding Cliches and Other Mishaps on the Term Pike, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at A5).  Personal 
computers permit instant access to volumes of information from case law, to sports scores, to stock 
quotes, to instantaneous breaking news.  Atteritano, supra at 378 n.1.  Researchers estimate that in 
the fourth quarter of 1997, over 62 million people in the U.S. were online and taking advantage of 
this new technology.  Id. at n.5.  As a result, the United States is amidst unprecedented 
technological change in which our capacity to produce, transmit, and receive information increases 
daily.  See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1999). 
 6. Digital technology can transfer and express text, audio and visual information extremely 
effectively using bits of data.  See Rod Dixon, Profits in Cyberspace: Should Newspaper and 
Magazine Publishers Pay Freelance Writers for Digital Content? 4 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REV. 127, 127 n.1 (1997) (citing PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE P.C. at 319-20 (6th ed. 1995)); Sony 
Media and Energy – Digital Future, available at http://www.sel.sony.com/SEL/rmeg/digitalfuture/ 
(last visited October 1, 2001).  Bits, expressed as either a “1” or a “0”, are the fundamental units of 
digital technological data.  Id.  The bits “1” and “0” represent on and off switches which allow 
electrical current to pass through the memory register of a computer or microchip.  Id.  Since binary 
bits enable easy digital expression and as digital technology expands the amount of data that can be 
processed on a microchip, digital format has become the format of choice in electronics.  Id. 
 7. Techno Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 68.  Digital wireless telephones 
are actually computers that can access the Internet, send and receive electronic mail, download 
sports scores in real time, and transmit faxes.  Id.  E-mail, short for electronic mail, is a method of 
communication via the Internet whereby one can address and transmit a message to one or more 
people.  Boddie, supra note 4, at 195. 
 8. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 378 (discussing the impact of digital technology); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Super Highway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright 
in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1995) (arguing digital technology makes it easy to 
make perfect digital copies of works, but copyright law is flexible enough to adequately cope with 
these new technologies); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of 
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 571 (2001) (arguing the digital information infrastructure 
2
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Unfortunately the technological revolution has sparked a civil war 
within copyright law.9  Congress has periodically, but consistently, 
modified the copyright laws to respond to the introduction of new 
technologies affecting copyright.10  Although Congress passed the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter Copyright Act or 1976 Act) to cope 
with emerging computer technology, no one anticipated the explosion of 
digital technology that has marked the dawning of the Information 
Age.11 
The overriding purpose of copyright law is “to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts.”12  To achieve this purpose 
                                                                                                                                 
makes private infringement easier and detection more difficult thereby making individual standards 
of moral and ethical conduct more important in copyright law); Dixon, supra note 6, at 127 
(discussing applicability of traditional copyright principles to new digital formats in which society 
receives information); April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The 
Electronic Frontier of the World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 75, 76 (1998) 
(discussing how digital technology enables almost anyone to be a publisher); John D. Shuff & 
Gregory T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555, 557 (2001) 
(discussing benefits of new technologies); David J. Loundy, Revising the Copyright Law for 
Electronic Publishing, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (1995) (discussing effect of 
digital technology on individuals, libraries, the publishing industry, and copyright law). 
 9. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see also supra note 8 (examining impact of digital technology 
on society); infra notes 12-17 (examining impact of digital technology on copyright law). 
 10. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From its 
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. . . 
Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. . .”); Robert Meitus, Interpreting the 
Copyright Act’s Section 201(c) Revision Privilege with Respect to Electronic Media, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 749, 753 (2000); Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 
Databases and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
977, 982 (1993); text infra note 35.  When technological change renders the terms of the Copyright 
Act ambiguous, the Court must construe the Copyright Act to further its underlying purpose; to 
maximize the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.  Twentieth Cent. 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932) (asserting the sole interest of the United States in copyright is benefiting the public); see also 
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327 (1858) (stating the ultimate aim of granting a limited 
monopoly to authors is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good); Grant v. 
Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832) (arguing that conferring benefit on the public via creative works 
is primary purpose of copyright). 
 11. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2002). “Many decades of technological, 
social and economic changes forced Congress to amend the 1909 Act in a piecemeal fashion.  But in 
1955, Congress authorized comprehensive hearings and reports that culminated – nearly twenty 
years later – in the 1976 Act.”  Meitus, supra note 10, at 754.  The 1976 Copyright Act provides 
protection to all works fixed in a tangible medium of expression regardless of whether it was 
published; extends copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy years; guarantees 
copyright owners five exclusive rights including reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, 
performance, and display; and allows copyright owners to license or assign the copyright in whole 
or in part getting rid of indivisibility.  Id. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The U.S. Constitution grants Congress “the Power . . . to 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and 
3
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authors are granted a limited monopoly in their works as an economic 
incentive to create and disseminate their works.13  This incentive to the 
authors competes against the fact that to promote the general welfare, the 
public must also have access to the new works.14  The author’s 
monopoly inherently restricts access to the works, but absent this limited 
monopoly there would be little incentive to create and thus fewer works 
to access.15  Copyright law delicately balances these competing interests 
to foster the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic works in 
order to enhance the public’s access to “science and the useful arts.”16 
Digital technology has upset the delicate balance of copyright law 
by increasing society’s access to authors’ works via the Internet, and by 
enabling society to make perfect digital copies of those works.17  Under 
the new digital regime, it is increasingly more difficult for authors to 
enforce their copyrights; while for the first time it is economically 
                                                                                                                                 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .” Id.  See also, 
Twentieth Cent. Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (discussing purposes of copyright law); Fox Film 
Corp., 286 U.S. at 127 (noting purpose of copyright); Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328 (stating purposes of 
copyright); Grant, 31 U.S. at 241 (discussing underlying purposes of copyright law). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See also, infra text, at notes 35-38 (looking at history of 
copyright law). 
 14. Dixon, supra note 6, at 140 (“. . .Courts must balance the constitutionally competing aims 
of promoting human creativity and original expression through strict enforcement of the copyright 
law with ensuring that broad copyright protections do not unfairly or unnecessarily prevent the 
development of our knowledge base – particularly, the nation’s development of practical uses of 
technology and information”). 
 15. See infra note 37 (discussing incentives created by copyright system). 
 16. Shuff, supra note 8, at 556.  (stating the various copyright statutes enacted over the past 
210 years have attempted to equalize the tensions by providing a sufficient incentive to ensure that 
new works are created while allowing for the broadest public consumption of those works).  It is a 
delicate balance that has shifted over the years to offer greater or lesser protections under the 
various statutes to achieve the same goals of benefiting the public.  Id.; see Pamela Samuelson, Fair 
Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of 
Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 49, 57 (1993). 
 17. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 285 (1996) (arguing digital technology threatens to upset copyright’s balance of private 
ownership and public access because once a work is online anyone, can make perfect digital copies, 
can make limitless variations, and can disseminate them to the ends of the earth); Halpern, supra 
note 8, at 597 (“The digital technology of recent years has significantly upset what was always a 
precarious balance and it is likely that further refinements to that technology will give rise to even 
more serious disruption.”); Shuff, supra note 8, at 555 (“The rapid and exponential expansion of our 
ability to duplicate and disseminate information by digital means has rejuvenated inherent tensions 
in the law pertaining to copyright and has created some new ones.”).  Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (1994) (“. . . widespread availability of photocopying technology 
threatens to disrupt the delicate balances established by the Copyright Act.”), cert. dismissed, 116 
S.Ct. 592 (1995).  Reproduction technologies create a pressing need for “the law to strike an 
appropriate balance between the authors’ interest in preserving the integrity of copyright, and the 
public’s right to enjoy the benefits that [the new technology] offers.”  Id., citing 3 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2001). 
4
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feasible for publishers and the public to make and sell individual 
infringing copies of a work.18  The characteristics of digital technology 
are changing the underlying assumptions of copyright law and leaving 
authors, publishers, and users confused as to their rights.19 
Copyright law finally confronted the Information Age in New York 
Times Co. v. Tasini20 when the Supreme Court applied copyright law to 
electronic publishing for the first time.21  The plaintiffs, six freelance 
writers, argued that the defendant print publishers infringed their 
copyrights by placing their freelance articles in electronic databases 
without the author’s permission.22  The defendants admit placing the 
articles in the electronic databases without permission, but they claim a 
privilege to republish the articles as part of a “revision” under §201(c) of 
the Copyright Act.23  The Supreme Court held that the articles 
republished in the electronic databases were not “part of” nor “revisions 
of” the original periodicals because they were presented individually.24  
Therefore, the freelance articles could not be re-licensed or re-published 
electronically by the print publishers without the author’s consent.25 
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini and its implications for the future of copyright 
law and electronic publishing.26  Part II of this Note documents the 
background of copyright law, and details how the default provisions of 
                                                                                                                                 
 18. Shuff, supra note 8, at 557.  (explainging digital technology’s “astonishingly low 
threshold of capitalization and technical expertise” allows copying and dissemination at the stroke 
of a key).  “The information infrastructure makes private infringement of intellectual property rights 
vastly easier to carry out and correspondingly more difficult to detect and prevent.”  Halpern, supra 
note 8, at 572, citing Comm. on Intell. Prop. Rights and the Emerging Info. Infrastructure, Nat’l 
Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, at ix (2000) 
(executive summary reprinted in 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (2001)).  The National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (hereinafter CONTU) concluded that where the cost of 
duplication is low, copies are more likely to be made; where more copies are likely to be made, 
legal protection is needed to preserve the incentive to create and disseminate the works that are 
being copied.  Nat’l Comm. on New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works 7 (1979). 
 19. Halpern, supra note 8, at 597 (arguing that the nature of modern copyright law obstructs 
the underlying purposes and fails to give society an unambiguous moral compass).  The actions of 
the average citizen on the Internet regularly violate copyright laws by downloading files, yet society 
merely thinks of these violations as mala prohibita crimes without a victim.  Id. at 572. 
 20. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483. 
 21. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483.  The Supreme Court decided in favor of the freelance authors in 
answering the long awaited question of who owns electronic rights to freelance articles.  Laurie A. 
Santelli, Note, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. 
New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 254 (1998). 
 22. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487. 
 23. Id.; 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2002). 
 24. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; see infra Part II-V. 
5
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§201(c) govern the publisher-author relationship.27  Part III of this Note 
introduces the parties and circumstances surrounding the Tasini case.28  
Part III continues by outlining the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York,29 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,30 
and the Supreme Court decisions in this landmark case.31  Part IV of this 
Note dissects the Supreme Court’s interpretation of §201(c)’s “revision” 
privilege and its application to electronic databases.32  Lastly, Part V of 
this Note discusses the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision 
and the potential effect it will have on electronic publishing and 
society.33 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A.  Overview of Copyright Law 
Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press marked the beginning 
of the mass production of literary works34 and, consequently, the need 
for copyright protection.35  Copyright laws developed in an effort to 
balance an author’s right to his creative works with the public’s interest 
in having access to those works.36  Copyright law aims to achieve this 
balance by granting authors exclusive rights in their works so as to 
encourage them to both create and disseminate their works for the public 
                                                                                                                                 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002); infra Part II. 
 28. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; infra Part III. 
 29. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804; infra Part III. 
 30. See Tasini, 206 F.3d 161; infra Part III. 
 31. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; infra Part III. 
 32. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2002); infra Part IV. 
 33. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see infra Part V. 
 34. “Literary works are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or 
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as 
books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are 
embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  This includes computer program, computer databases and all 
digital works.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
 35. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) 
(discussing how copyright protection was not necessary prior to the printing press because hand 
copying literary works was too costly and time consuming to pose a threat to authors’ interests).  
See also Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Author’s Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1995) (examining history of copyright law); Yuri Hur, Note, Tasini v. New York Times: 
Ownership of Electronic Copyrights Rightfully Returned to Authors, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 65 
(2000) (discussing development of copyright law). 
 36. Santelli, supra note 21, at 258 (explaining how England passed the Statute of Anne, the 
first copyright statute, in 1710 granting authors the exclusive right to copy their books for fourteen 
years).  The book then became part of the public domain for the public’s benefit.  Id. 
6
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good.37  The Supreme Court acknowledged, “[e]ncouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through talents of authors and inventors in ‘science and the 
useful arts.’”38 
The United States Constitution embodies these ideals by giving 
Congress “the Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”39  
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has passed numerous 
comprehensive copyright statutes,40 the most recent being the Copyright 
Act of 1976.41 
Under the 1976 Act, copyrights are granted to original works of 
authorship in any fixed, tangible medium of expression.42  The author of 
                                                                                                                                 
 37. Boddie, supra note 4, at 215 (discussing the fundamental purpose of copyright law is to 
encourage individuals to produce and disseminate creative works to the public).  By providing 
authors with exclusive rights to their works, they will not fear the theft of their work hence 
promoting dissemination.  Id.  Additionally, these exclusive rights provide an economic incentive to 
produce new works because the authors can reap the benefits of their efforts.  Id.  See also, 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002). 
 38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 40. Meitus, supra note 10, at 753 (discussing how Congress passed the first federal copyright 
statute in 1790 granting protection to maps, charts, or books for fourteen years with an equal 
renewal period).  General revisions took place in 1831 and 1870.  Id.  In 1909 Congress overhauled 
the old copyright statute and adopted the 1909 Act which: expanded the subject matter of 
copyrights; extended the duration of copyrights, and changed the trigger for federal protection to 
publication instead of registration.  Id.  The 1909 Act was amended throughout the twentieth 
century to meet social and technological changes, but in 1955 Congress authorized comprehensive 
hearings and reports that culminated in the Copyright Act.  Id.  See also Michael Spink, Authors 
Stripped of Their Electronic Rights In Tasini v. New York Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
409, 418 (1999) (laying out progression of United States’ copyright laws). 
 41. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2002).  The 1976 Act provides protection 
to all “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002) (stating subject matter of 
copyright).  A work is fixed when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecords is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining “fixed”).  The 1976 Act 
does not require the work to be published in order to be protection.  See id.  It extended the duration 
of protection to the life of the author plus seventy years.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2002).  The 1976 Act 
guarantees authors five exclusive rights: reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, performance, 
and display.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).  It also allows for divisibility of a copyright through licensing 
of a copyright in whole or in part.  Meitus, supra note 10, at 754. 
 42. Frank H. Smith, Tasini v. New York Times Co.: A Copyright, or a Right to Copy?, 32 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1998).  Under the 1976 Act, Congress has the power to grant a 
copyright “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known 
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).  There are two basic 
7
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the work is the original owner of the copyright.43  The copyright owner 
is granted a bundle of exclusive rights including the right to reproduce 
the work, distribute copies, create derivative works, publicly perform the 
work, and display the work.44  Each exclusive right is divisible from the 
                                                                                                                                 
requirements for copyright protection: originality and fixation.  See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002); Jack 
B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 
65 TEX. L. REV. 993, 997 (1987).  The originality requirement stems from the Court’s interpretation 
of “author” to mean “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; or maker.”  Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding arrangement of photographic subject 
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection), noted in Hicks, supra at 997.  To meet this 
low threshold standard the author must contribute something more than a trivial variation; the work 
must be independently created, not copied, and possesses a minimal degree of creativity.  Burrow-
Giles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 53 (holding photographic layout and set design sufficiently original 
for copyright protection); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) 
(holding advertisements “in their ensemble and in all their details, in their design and particular 
combinations of figures, lines and colors, are the original work of the plaintiffs’ designer”); Feist 
Publn’s Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding listing names alphabetically in 
telephone directory was not sufficiently original to grant copyright protection).  Creativity is usually 
only an issue when the object of copyright is short and is mainly functional.  Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (inferring some modicum of creativity is required when the 
Court defined a “writing” as “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic 
labor”), quoted in Hicks, supra, at 998; Smith v. George E. Muelebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 
729 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (holding a two note musical composition “too simple” for copyright).  The 
fixation requirement means a work must be more than an idea, procedure, process, system, concept, 
or discovery; it must be an expression of that idea in a tangible form.  Hicks, supra, at 999; see 
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photograph falls under copyright law’s protection of 
fixed writings). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) (discussing how generally the author is the party who actually 
creates the work, the party who translates the idea into a fixed, tangible medium of expression).  
However, the 1976 Act contains an exception whereby “If the work is for hire,  ‘the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author,’ and consequently they own 
the copyright, not the creator.”  Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989) (holding independent sculptor was not an employee of organization who hired him to make 
statue, thus the statue was not a work made for hire), citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2002).  In deciding 
if a work is made for hire, a court must first use principles of the general common law of agency to 
determine whether an employee or an independent contractor made the work.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 
751.  If a work was made by an employee, the court applies § 101(1) which states, “A ‘work for 
hire’ is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.”  17 U.S.C. § 
101(1) (defining work made for hire).  If a work was created by an independent contractor, the court 
can apply § 101(2) that allows the parties to expressly agree in a written instrument that a work is 
“made for hire” only if the work is, “specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to 
a collective work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a 
test, or as an atlas.”  Reid, 490 U.S. at 751; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining “work made for 
hire”).  The “work made for hire” doctrine is very important to freelance creators because it 
determines to which works they own copyrights, and to which works their patrons hold the 
copyrights.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 737. 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (referring to 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights as a bundle of rights in their work). 
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others and, therefore, independently transferable.45  A transfer of one or 
all of these exclusive rights is valid only if conveyed in writing and 
signed by the copyright owner.46 
B.  Authors, Publishers, and Collective Works 
A collective work is a work, such as a periodical, newspaper, or 
anthology, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and 
independently copyrightable works, are assembled into a collective 
whole.47  “Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is 
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests 
initially in the author of the contribution.”48  Copyright in the collective 
work as a whole vests in the collective author and only covers the 
creative material added by that author, not the preexisting material.49 
                                                                                                                                 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2002). The copyright owner may transfer any exclusive rights 
individually while retaining ownership of the remaining exclusive rights.  17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) 
(2002).  Any one of the exclusive rights may be transferred and owned separately.  Id. 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2002). 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining “collective work”).  A collective work is a type of 
compilation.  Id.  A compilation is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work 
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”  Id. (defining compilation).  A compilation 
may be made of previously copyrighted works or of works/data that is not copyrightable standing 
alone.  Hicks, supra note 42, at 1001. 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002) (“Copyright in a compilation or derivative extends only to the 
material contributed by the author of such a work, as distinguished from the preexisting material 
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.  The 
copyright in such work is independent of and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, 
ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting work.”).  A magazine 
publisher has a copyright in the magazine as a collective work, but photographers, advertisers, and 
freelance writers have separate copyrights in the independent pictures and articles contributed to the 
magazine.  Wendy J. Gordon, Fine Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and 
Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473, 479 (2000).  Thus a party wishing to copy a magazine must 
get permission from the copyright owner of the collective work (publisher), and from each of the 
owners of the copyrights in the individual articles, advertisements, and photographs.  Id. 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002); see supra note 20.  Authors of compilations are deemed to 
contribute originality through selection, coordination and arrangement of the underlying facts or 
works, thus only granting them copyright protection to these aspects of the compilation.  See 17 
U.S.C § 101 (2002) (defining compilation); Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
341 (1991) (holding telephone directory not copyrightable because selection was mandated by state 
law, and alphabetical arrangement was not original).  For compilations of preexisting material, the 
arrangement is often the only contribution of the compiler.  Hicks, supra note 42, at 1002, citing 
Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 958 
(1966); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937); PIC Design Corp. V. Sterling Precision 
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 
F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926).  “Under the arrangement doctrine, if an 
original (non copied) arrangement of information is chosen and the required quantity of intellectual 
labor is expended, copyright is deserved.”  Hicks, supra note 42, at 1002.  Subjective selection of 
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Prior to the 1976 Act, freelance authors risked losing their 
copyrights when their articles were included in collective works such as 
newspapers.50  The 1976 Act addressed this unfair situation so as to 
preserve an author’s rights when he placed his works in compilations.51  
The 1976 Act recast copyright as an exclusive bundle of rights, each of 
which could be exclusively transferred or owned.52  When an author 
includes an article in a collective work, “the owner of copyright in the 
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of 
                                                                                                                                 
what to gather, and what to include in a compilation is another form of copyrightable expression 
found in compilations.  Id. at 1005.  “The creative effort involved in selecting and compiling such 
material satisfies copyright’s requirement of originality and creativity.”  Id., citing Eckes v. Card 
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to 
Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1942); College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 
F.2d 874, 875 (2d Cir. 1941); Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).  
However, compilations substantially similar to the original are not copyrightable.  Hicks, supra note 
42, at 1006.  Subjective selection is usually only applied to small compilations because the compiler 
has narrowed the wide range of possible subjects down to a few select components of the 
compilation.  Id.  Compilations based on objective criteria, such as all telephone numbers in a state, 
are not protected under the subjective selection doctrine.  Id. 
 50. See Matthew Hoff, Tasini v. New York Times: What the Second Circuit Didn’t Say, 10 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 132 (1999) (discussing the same).  Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a 
copyright was a single, indivisible right.  Id.  Since there was no partial assignment of copyright, 
any transfer had to be either a complete transfer of rights, or a mere license.  Id.  The 1909 Act 
required copyright notice in the name of the copyright proprietor in order to protect the work.  Id.  
Since a licensee was not a proprietor, the publisher’s copyright notice did not protect freelance 
writers’ articles included in collective works.  Id.  The freelance authors were left with two 
unacceptable choices: 1) license their articles to be published in a collective work (hoping the 
publisher might include a separate copyright notice without which the article would fall into the 
public domain), or 2) transfer the whole copyright to the publisher, thus making him the proprietor 
and protecting the article (but the author has lost all future rights in the work).  Id., at 133.  Since 
publishers rarely included separate copyright notices for contributions, the authors were stuck with 
transferring the whole copyright or losing their work to the public domain.  Hoff, supra, at 33.  
Known as the “Doctrine of Indivisibility,” this scheme often led to authors losing all of the rights to 
their works when they did not intend that result.  Id., at 134.  In addition, under the 1909 Act, an 
author could not sue a third party for infringement if they had previously licensed a publisher to use 
the work.  Id. 
 51. Hoff, supra note 50, at 134 (discussing how the Doctrine of Indivisibility was widely 
criticized as being unfair to authors, so courts began to erode the Doctrine).  Goodis v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 399 (2d. Cir. 1970) (holding an author’s work did not fall 
into the public domain as long as there was a copyright notice on the work, even if it was in the 
publisher’s name).  The Doctrine of Indivisibility was finally killed by the passage of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 which recognized copyright as a bundle of divisible, exclusive rights.  Hoff, supra note 
50, at 132.  An author could now assign certain rights to a publisher and retain the others to possibly 
assign in the future.  Id. 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to do and authorize 
any of the following: to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute, to perform, and to 
display); 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2002) (“[t]he ownership of copyright may be transferred in whole or 
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass 
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”). 
10
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reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that collective 
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work 
in the same series.”53  The 1976 Act also provides that a single copyright 
notice, applicable to the collective work as a whole, is sufficient to 
protect the rights of freelance authors in their contributions.54  Today, 
copyright law allows freelance authors to resell their articles after their 
initial publication, thus allowing them to benefit from future demand for 
their contributions standing alone or in a new collection.55  Taken as a 
whole, the Copyright Act was designed to preserve the author’s 
copyright in his contribution to a collective work.56 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
Six freelance authors brought suit against print and electronic 
                                                                                                                                 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002) (emphasis added).  Owners of copyrights in collective works 
have a different right than the copyright owner of a contributed article.  Charles S. Sims & Matthew 
J. Morris, Tasini and Archival Electronic Publication Rights of Newspapers and Magazines, 18 
COMM. LAW. 9, 10 (2001).  “The extent of these differing rights for authors and publishers depends 
on the construction of §201(c).”  Id.  The authors argue §201(c) grants no rights but only a privilege, 
a non-exclusive and non-transferable license to print each article in the original issue of the 
periodical and in later versions, limited to the original medium of publication.  Id.  The publishers 
argue that it is a limited right, which is transferable to other mediums or other parties.  Id. 
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2002) (“Notice of Copyright: . . . A separate contribution to a 
collective work may bear its own notice of copyright, . . . [h]owever, a single notice applicable to 
the collective work as a whole is sufficient to invoke the provisions of section 401(d) or 402(d) . . . 
regardless of the ownership of the copyright in the contributions and whether they have been 
previously published.”).  Previously, a single copyright notice on a collective work did not protect 
the contributing freelance author’s works because the publisher’s notice only applied to works 
owned by the publisher, therefore licensed works were published without copyright notice and fell 
into the public domain.  Goodis, 425 F.2d at 400. 
 55. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 497, citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 
229 (1990) (“when an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in the market 
than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute is designed to provide the author the power 
to negotiate for the realized value of the work.”). 
 56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.  The House 
of Representatives Report explains: 
The second sentence of section 201(c), in conjunction with the provisions of section 404 
dealing with copyright notice, will preserve the author’s copyright in a contribution even 
if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in the author’s own name, and without 
requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner of the collective work.  This is 
coupled with a presumption that unless there has been an express transfer of more, the 
owner of the collective work acquires ‘only the privilege of reproducing and distributing 
the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective 
work, and any later collective work in the same series. 
Id. 
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publishers for copyright infringement when, without express 
authorization, their articles were included in electronic databases.57  The 
plaintiffs in this case were freelance writers who had sold articles to the 
defendant newspapers and magazines for publication.58  The defendant 
print publishers, New York Times Co. (NY Times), Newsday, Inc. 
(Newsday) and Time, Inc. (Time) engaged the authors as independent 
contractors through contracts and oral licenses that did not secure the 
authors’ consent to place the articles in an electronic database.59  The 
defendant print publishers then licensed the electronic defendants, 
LEXIS/NEXIS (NEXIS) and University Microfilms International 
(UMI), to copy and sell the articles via their electronic databases.60 
NEXIS produces an online database that allows subscribers to 
access the full-text of any article in their database via a search engine.61  
UMI produces the “N.Y. Times OnDisc” CD-ROM (NYTO) that allows 
users to search and retrieve full-text articles from past editions of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 57. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (1997). 
 58. Id. (discussing how the original Plaintiffs were eleven freelance writers and photographers 
who contributed to the collective works of the print publisher defendants).  Only six plaintiffs 
remained when the district court granted summary judgment including: Jonathon Tasini, Mary Kay 
Blakley, Barbara Garson, Margot Mifflin, Sonia Jaffe Robbins, and David S. Whitford.  Id.  
Jonathon Tasini is the President of the National Writers Union Local 1981.  See Patrick O’Connor, 
Online Computer Databases and CD-ROMs are not the Electronic Equivalent of Microfilm: Tasini 
v. New York Times Co., Electronic Revisions and Individual Contributions to Collective Works 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 521, 524 (1998).  The National Writers 
Union represents the interests of approximately 4,500 freelance journalists, book authors, poets, 
technical writers and editorial cartoonists, and funded the plaintiff’s action against the print and 
electronic publishers.  Id. 
 59. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809 (discussing how the defendants asserted they had acquired 
express transfer of the freelancer’s rights in the articles, but the district court concluded that no such 
transfer had taken place).  It is also important to note the significance of the authors acting as 
independent contractors rather than as employees because a work “prepared by an employee within 
the scope of his or her employment” is a “work made for hire”.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).  Under the 
Copyright Act, the employer acquires the copyright in any “work made for hire”, thus if an author is 
an employee, they do not retain any rights in their works.  Id. at § 201(b); See also Hur, supra note 
35 (examining “work made for hire” doctrine). 
 60. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 489 (discussing how each print publisher had an agreement with 
LEXIS/NEXIS where they provided NEXIS with all the individual articles from their print 
periodicals).  The license authorized NEXIS to copy or sell any portion of those texts.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 490 (describing NEXIS’s services).  The print publishers and NEXIS place 
additional coding in each article to facilitate retrieval from the central database.  Id.  Subscribers can 
then search for articles by author, subject, date, publication, headline, key term words in text, or 
other criteria.  Id.  The subscriber can then view, download or print the articles that match his search 
criteria.  Id.  Each article is displayed with a header informing the reader of the original print 
publication, date, section, initial page number, headline or title, and author.  Id.  Each article is 
displayed independently without any visible link to other articles from the original periodical.  Id.  
The results are in a text-only format where pictures, advertisements, and original formatting features 
such as font, page placement, and location of continuation pages are lost.  Id. 
12
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New York Times similar to the NEXIS database.62  UMI also produces 
the “General Periodicals OnDisc” CD-ROM (GPO) that contains 
selected New York Times articles along with thousands of other 
articles.63  GPO presents the New York Times Book Review and 
Magazine sections as image-based files that show the entire page of the 
periodical in context, rather than just the text of the article like NEXIS 
and NYTO.64 
The plaintiffs brought suit in the Southern District of New York 
claiming that by providing the articles to the electronic databases, the 
defendant publishers infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights in the articles 
they had licensed to the publishers.65  The defendants contend they are 
privileged under §201(c) of the 1976 Act to reproduce and distribute the 
individual works in “any revision of that collective work.”66  The crux of 
this case is therefore the Supreme Court’s legal definition of the term 
“revision,” or more precisely, whether the electronic databases are 
permissible “revisions” of the individual periodical from which the 
articles were taken.67 
B.  The District Court for the Southern District of New York68 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants holding §201(c) shielded the defendant publishers from 
liability because the electronic databases were permissible “revisions” of 
                                                                                                                                 
 62. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 490 (describing UMI’s business).  NYTO is a text-only system much 
like the NEXIS database where a header is added but most of the original formatting is lost.  Id. 
 63. Id.  (discussing how New York Times licensed GPO to provide a facsimile of the NY 
Times Sunday Book Review and Magazine).  UMI “burns” the image of the periodical page onto 
the GPO CD-ROM so an article appears exactly as it appears on the printed page, complete with 
photographs, captions, advertisements, and other formatting.  Id.  GPO also contains articles from 
approximately 200 additional publications.  Id.  The CD-ROMs are searched in the same manner as 
the NEXIS database, and may be viewed, downloaded or printed.  Id. 
 64. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491; see also, supra note 61 (setting forth how electronic databases 
function). 
 65. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 66. Id.  “In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the 
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of 
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular work, any revision of that 
collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.” (emphasis added). 17 U.S.C. § 
201(c) (1994). 
 67. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 (describing the same).  Webster’s defines “revision” as  “1. the 
act, process, or work of revising; review; re-examination for correction; as, the revision of a book or 
of a proof sheet; a revision of statutes.  2.  the result of revising; a revised form or version, as of a 
book, manuscript, etc.”  WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1552 (2d ed. 
1983). 
 68. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804. 
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the original periodicals.69  First, the court rejected two of the defendants’ 
claims that some plaintiffs expressly transferred their electronic rights.70  
Next, the court found their § 201(c)’s “revision” privilege was 
transferable, included display rights, and need not be in the same 
medium as the original.71  Finally, the court held that the electronic 
databases “reproduced and distributed” the author’s works “as part 
of . . . [a] revision of that collective work” to which the authors had 
originally contributed.72 
                                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. (discussing the District Courts reasoning).  Summary Judgment is required when 
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).  The moving party has the initial burden of informing the 
court of the basis of its motion and identifying the matter it believes demonstrates the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact.  Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Once a party satisfies 
its initial burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue 
for trial.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).  The court must resolve any factual ambiguities in favor of the 
nonmovant.  Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804, 810, citing McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 70. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810 (discussing how Newsday and Sports Illustrated claimed that 
some plaintiffs expressly transferred their electronic rights to the print publishers).  Section 204(a) 
of the Copyright Act states “a transfer of copyright ownership . . . is not valid unless an instrument 
or conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of 
the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”  17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2002).  Newsday 
asserted the checks used to pay plaintiffs had an agreement on the back that, if cashed, granted 
Newsday the “right to include [plaintiff’s articles] in electronic library archives.”  Tasini, 972 F. 
Supp. at 810.  The district court noted: 1) there was no prior agreement or mutual consent 
concerning the electronic rights (i.e. articles were published before authors received checks), 2) the 
legends were ambiguous and don’t reflect an express transfer of electronic rights, and 3) archives 
and “electronic libraries”, one of which Newsday maintained itself, do not include selling the 
articles to a commercial database such as NEXIS.  Id. at 810-11.  Sports Illustrated claimed they had 
the right to publish the articles in electronic form under Section 10(a) of its contracts that granted 
them the right “first to publish”.  Id.  However, the court rejected this claim because the articles 
were “first” published in print forty-five days prior to them being published electronically.  Id. at 
812.  The district court could not find that any of the plaintiffs expressly transferred electronic rights 
in their articles.  Id. 
 71. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 815 (discussing how the district court reasoned it was permissible 
for the print defendants to transfer the § 201(c) privilege to the electronic defendants because “the 
aim of § 201(c)—to avoid the unfairness of indivisibility—would not be further served” by making 
the privilege non-transferable).  Rather the court treated the privilege as a divisible portion of 
copyright that could be individually and separately transferred.  Id.  Further, the court found no 
support for the plaintiff’s claim that the legislative history of § 201(c) only intended to allow 
revisions and reproductions in the same medium as the original.  Id.  The court noted, and both 
parties conceded, that microfilm archives of newspapers are acceptable “revisions” under § 201(c) 
although they are in a different medium.  Id.  Lastly, the court held although § 201(c) only grants 
the right to reproduce the work as a revision, it implicitly includes the right to display the work 
since a work cannot be displayed electronically without being displayed on a screen.  Id. at 816. 
 72. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806; see 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).  The defendants are only permitted to 
place plaintiff’s articles into revisions of those collective works in which the articles first appeared, 
not “new anthologies” or “entirely different magazines or other collective works.”  Tasini, 972 F. 
Supp. at 806, citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976).  Compilations and collective works, such 
14
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The district court used a two-step analysis to determine whether the 
databases qualified as “revisions.”73  First, the district court identified 
the distinguishing characteristics that rendered the defendant’s collective 
work original.74  Second, the court determined whether these 
characteristics were preserved in the alleged revision, or rather whether 
the two works were “substantially similar.”75  The district court found 
the databases preserved the print publishers’ “selection” of articles by 
including all of the articles originally assembled by the print 
publishers.76  Additionally, the databases “highlighted the connection 
                                                                                                                                 
as defendant’s periodicals, are characterized by the fact that they have relatively little originality, 
thus if defendants change the original selection and arrangement of their newspapers, they are at 
risk of creating new works no longer recognizable as versions of the original periodicals.  Id.  When 
“revising” their periodicals, defendants must preserve some significant original aspect of those 
original works, whether selection or arrangement, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 201(c).  
Id.  The district court concluded that “it is only if such distinguishing original characteristic remains 
that the resulting creation can fairly be termed a revision of that collective work which preceded it.”  
Id. at 821. 
 73. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 821 (discussing the same).  The court’s two-step analysis is 
derived from the “substantial similarity” test used for determining infringement of collective works.  
Id. at 822.  In determining infringement of collective works, “courts begin by determining whether 
the plaintiff’s compilation exhibits sufficient originality to merit protection; if there is sufficient 
originality in either selection or arrangement, it is necessary to determine whether these original 
elements have been copied into the allegedly infringing work.”  Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 821.  A 
defendant infringes the Plaintiff’s copyright when he copies the original aspects of a protected 
collective work so extensively so as to render the “offending and copyrighted works substantially 
similar.”  Id., citing Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intern. Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 
1995).  The district court reasoned that the current case should use this test reciprocally whereby if 
the original selection or arrangement of materials is preserved, the electronic reproductions are 
permissible revisions of “that collective work”.  Id. at 822.  But, if the original aspects of selection 
or arrangement are not preserved, the electronic reproductions are impermissibly exploiting 
plaintiff’s rights in the underlying works.  Id. 
 74. Id. at 821.  The factors for originality are derived from the Copyright Act’s definition of a 
“compilation”, it is a work formed by the collection and assembly of preexisting materials or of data 
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of authorship” (emphasis added).  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002); Feist 
Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (concluding most compilations 
reflect sufficient originality in selection and arrangement to merit copyright protection, but not 
every selection, coordination, or arrangement will” be sufficiently original, i.e. alphabetical order). 
 75. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823.  A subsequent work must preserve more than a “certain 
percentage” of the original selection of materials.  Id., citing Worth v. Selchow & Richter Co., 827 
F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding defendants trivia game did not copy selection of facts from 
trivia book because game only used a fraction of those facts).  The subsequent work must not differ 
in selection by “more than a trivial degree” from the earlier work.  Id., citing Kregos v. Associated 
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding copying six of nine statistic categories is not 
infringement).  The district court did not focus on what was different between the two works, but 
rather focused on what the publishers retained in their alleged revisions.  Id. at 824. 
 76. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823 (discussing the same).  The court reasoned that a defining 
element of the defendant’s publications is the selection of the articles included in those works.  Id.  
The New York Times, in identifying “all the news that’s fit to print,” performs a highly subjective 
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between plaintiff’s article and the hard copy periodicals” in tags that 
identify the article’s original location in a particular publication.77  Thus, 
the electronic databases were deemed “revision[s]” under §201(c) 
because they contained “recognizable versions of the publishers’ 
newspapers and magazines.”78 
The district court denied the freelance authors’ motion for 
reconsideration in an opinion clarifying its previous opinion.79 
C.   The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit80 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.81  The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis by 
recognizing the databases do almost nothing to preserve the 
                                                                                                                                 
selection process that actually defines the character of the paper and distinguishes it from others.  Id.  
The print publisher’s selection is preserved electronically because the articles would not have 
appeared online had it not been for their selection to be in the New York Times, and the print 
publisher’s entire selection of articles is included in the electronic databases.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 824 (discussing the same).  The district court noted that the electronic databases 
repeatedly identify the publication from which each article was taken thus enhancing the value of 
that article.  Id.  An article “tagged” as from the New York Times “is instantly imbued with a 
certain degree of credibility that might not exist in the case of an article never published, or an 
article published in other periodicals.”  Id. at 824 n.14.  The credibility and value that an article 
gains from being published in a noteworthy publication is retained in the electronic publications due 
to the print publisher’s selection.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 825. 
 79. Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 841, 843 (1997) (discussing how 
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, raising a number of objections to the district court’s 
approach in its opinion).  First, plaintiffs argue that the court should have ruled for the freelance 
author because the court rejected Time Inc.’s claim that it had acquired electronic rights via one of 
the contract.  Id. The district court clarified that simply because a freelancer did not contract away 
his electronic rights, this fact does not impact the publisher’s privilege to reproduce revisions of 
their periodicals, absent an express transfer of rights.  Id. at 845  Second, plaintiffs argue that under 
the court’s interpretation of § 201(c), there remains a disputed question of fact as to whether any of 
the electronic technologies involved in this case qualify as permissible revisions.  Id. at 843.  The 
court restated the established fact that selection was preserved and that all of the print articles were 
included in the databases therefore making the print and electronic publications substantially similar 
as a matter of law.  Id. at 849.  Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court mistakenly didn’t seriously 
consider plaintiff’s infringement claim arising from abstracts of the freelance articles in GPO.  Id. at 
843.  The court noted the text-based NEXIS and NYTO both qualified as revisions, therefore text-
based abstracts in GPO are also permissible revisions of the original work.  Id. at 851. 
 80. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 81. Id. at 172 (discussing the same).  The authors argued on appeal that § 201(c) only allowed 
publishers to include their works in the original collective work and does not allow individually 
copyrighted works to be included in one or more electronic databases.  Id. at 165.  The authors also 
argued that the publisher’s privilege under § 201(c) is not transferable to the electronic publishers.  
Id.  The Second Circuit held that § 201(c) does not permit publishers to license individually 
copyrighted works for inclusion in electronic databases.  Id.  Consequently, the court did not 
address whether the privilege was transferable under § 201(d).  Id. 
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copyrightable aspects of the publisher’s collective works.82  The court 
concentrated on how the enormous electronic databases engulfed the 
individual articles and periodicals.83  The Second Circuit found the 
databases were primarily used to provide the end users with access to 
“the preexisting materials that belong to the individual author.”84  The 
court noted “§201(c) would not permit a Publisher to sell a hard copy of 
an Author’s article directly to the public even if the Publisher also 
offered for individual sale all of the other articles from the particular 
edition.  We see nothing in the revision provision that would allow the 
Publishers to achieve the same goal indirectly through NEXIS.”85 
Additionally, the Second Circuit addressed the parties’ 
interpretation of the term “revision.”86  The court reasoned that since 
§201(c) was adopted to end “indivisibility”87 and preserve an author’s 
rights in his contributions, the defendants’ overly broad reading of the 
term “revision” “would cause the exception to swallow the rule.”88  The 
                                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 168 (discussing the same).  Some of the paper’s content and most of the paper’s 
arrangement are lost when a particular edition of a magazine or newspaper is placed in an electronic 
database.  Id. at 169.  It is actually difficult for the users of the databases to reconstruct the original 
periodical or collect all of the articles from a particular edition.  Id.  In fact, The New York Times 
forbids NEXIS from producing “facsimile reproductions” of particular editions.  See Tasini, 533 
U.S. 483 (2001). 
 83. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168 (stating “NEXIS is a database comprising thousands or millions of 
individually retrievable articles taken from hundreds or thousands of periodicals.  It can hardly be 
deemed a ‘revision’ of each and every edition of every periodical that it contains”). 
 84. Id. at 169 (discussing the same).  Section 201(c) and § 103(b) provide that the author of 
the individual contribution retains all rights in his work, and may sue for infringement of that work.  
Id. 
 85. Id. at 168. 
 86. Id. at 167, citing Exch. Comm’n v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (noting 
that proper statutory construction mandates that particular phrases be interpreted in context).  
Applying this rule to § 201(c), the court found: 
The first clause sets the floor so to speak, of the presumptive privilege: the author of the 
collective work is permitted to reproduce and distribute individual contributions as part 
of  “that particular collective work.”  In this context ‘that particular collective work 
means a specific edition or issue of a periodical.  The second clause expands on this, to 
permit the reproduction and distribution of the individual contribution as part of a 
“revision” of “that collective work,” i.e., a revision of a particular edition of a specific 
periodical.  Finally, the third clause sets the outer limit or ceiling on what the publisher 
may do; it permits the reproduction and distribution of the individual contribution as part 
of a “later collective work in the same series,” such as a new edition of a dictionary or 
encyclopedia. 
Id. at 167; 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994). 
 87. See supra notes 50-51 for a discussion of the “Doctrine of Indivisibility.” 
 88. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168, citing Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (when a 
statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions “narrowly in 
order to preserve the primary operation of the provision”).Section 201(c) was a key player in 
eradicating the doctrine of indivisibility in the Copyright Act by explicitly stating that absent and 
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court also noted the publisher’s interpretation conflicted with accepted 
canons of statutory construction by failing to construe §201(c) in such a 
manner so as to give meaning to each of its parts.89  Consequently, the 
Second Circuit adopted a more narrow definition of “revision” and held 
the electronic databases were not permissible “revisions” of the 
individual periodicals.90 
D.  The United States Supreme Court91 
The Supreme Court, with a seven justice majority, affirmed the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision holding the freelance articles 
republished in the electronic databases are not “part of”, nor “revisions 
of”, the print periodicals, and therefore cannot be re-licensed without the 
author’s consent.92 
The Supreme Court rejected the publisher’s argument that the 
databases are “revisions” because the articles are individually retrieved 
and individually displayed to the user absent their original context.93  
                                                                                                                                 
express transfer of rights, the authors retain all rights to their contributions placed in collective 
works.  Id.  The second sentence of § 201(c) sets out the three exceptions to this general rule.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).  Therefore, the court held that they should narrowly construe the 
exceptions so as to “preserve the primary operation of the provision,” to preserve the author’s rights 
in their contributions to collective works.  Clark, 489 U.S. at 739; Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168. 
 89. Id. at 167.  First, the court reasoned that if the contents of an electronic database are 
revisions of the collective work, then the last clause of § 201(c), allowing the reproduction of 
individual works “as part of a later collective work in the same series” would be superfluous.  Id., 
citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998).  An electronic database contains thousands of 
editions from hundreds of periodicals; to view the contents of this database as a revision of each of 
those editions would eliminate any need for a privilege for “a later collective work in the same 
series.”  Id. at 167.  Rather, the court interpreted § 201(c)’s three privileges as the floor, middle, and 
ceiling of publishers’ rights.  See supra note 86. 
 90. See supra notes 81-89.  Additionally, the court relied on legislative history that noted the 
“revision” and “later collective work in the same series” clauses of § 201(c) were not intended to 
permit the inclusion of previously published freelance contributions “in a new anthology or an 
entirely different magazine or other collective work.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 123 (1976).  The 
court concluded that because each database contained innumerable articles from outside publishers 
and/or editions, the databases were “at best a new anthology of innumerable editions . . . and at 
worst a new anthology of innumerable articles from these editions.”  Tasini, 206 F.3d at 167. 
 91. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 92. Id. at 493. 
 93. Id. at 499-500.  Copyright is very concerned with perception as is evidenced in the 
fixation requirement (“a work is fixed . . . when its embodiment . . . permit[s] it to be 
perceived . . .”), and the definition of copyrightable subject matter (“original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium . . . from which they can be perceived . . .”).  Alice Haemmerli, 
Symposium on Electronic Rights in International Perspective, Commentary: Tasini v. New York 
Times Co., 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 142-43 (1998); See also, Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 
(focusing on perception of the user to determine if electronic database is a revision).  Consequently, 
the Court gave great weight to the manner in which the common user was able to perceive the 
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The Court stated, “it would scarcely preserve the author’s copyright in a 
contribution if a newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted to 
reproduce or distribute copies of the author’s contribution in isolation.”94  
The Court also rejected the publisher’s claim that “media neutrality” 
allowed the transfer of freelance articles into the electronic databases.95  
The Court’s reasoning distinguished the transfer of newspapers to 
microfiche, a permissible revision, from the transfer to electronic 
databases because microfiche converts the original periodicals into the 
new media intact, while the databases strip the articles of their original 
context.96  Lastly, the Court dismissed the publishers’ policy argument 
that finding for the freelance authors would leave “gaping holes in the 
electronic record of history” when unauthorized articles were deleted 
from the databases.97  The Court noted this speculative prediction was 
                                                                                                                                 
freelance articles.  Id.  The Court found the databases “present articles to users clear of the context 
provided either by the original periodical or by any revision of those editions,” because database 
“searches” retrieved articles as individual results, and displayed them without the graphics, 
formatting, or other articles with which the article was initially published.  Id. at 500.  The GPO 
CD-ROM presented the articles in context as a visual image of the original page, but the database 
still lacked all of the other material and formatting from surrounding pages of the original 
periodical.  Id.  At best, the databases were new collective works made up of thousands of 
individual editions, each of which makes up only a tiny portion of the larger work.  Id.  From 
another point of view, the articles are not “part of” a larger work at all, but stand as individual 
works, presented individually.  Id.  Therefore the individual articles were not reproduced and 
distributed “as part of” either the original edition or a revision of that edition.  Id. 
 94. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; see Gordon, supra note 48, at 484-485.  The Court noted the 
Copyright Act “adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its collective work to accommodate a freelancer’s 
copyright in her contribution.  If there is demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new 
collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand.”  Tasini, 533 U.S. 
at 497.  The Court disregarded the significance of the identifying “tags” that cited the source of 
origin because they merely suggest the articles were previously part of that periodical, and do not 
mean the articles are currently part of that periodical.  Id.  Thus, the databases impermissibly 
reproduced and distributed the articles individually.  Id. at 500. 
 95. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502.  The concept of media neutrality is based in Copyright Act’s § 
102(a) that grants copyright protection to original works “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”  Id.  The transfer of a work between media does not alter the character of that work for 
copyright purposes.  Id.  However, the Court held the transfer to electronic databases does not 
represent a mere conversion of intact periodical from one medium to another like microfiche.  Id. 
 96. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502.  Microfilm and microfiche contain continuous photographic 
reproductions of a periodical in the medium of miniaturized film whereby the articles appear in 
precisely the same position as in the original periodical, both on the page and within the larger 
periodical as a whole.  Id.  Although microfilm rolls contain numerous editions (like the databases) 
and the user can focus on just one article (like the databases), the microfilm distinguishes itself by 
presenting the articles in their original context of the periodical as a whole.  Id.  On the other hand, 
NEXIS and NYTO individually present the articles disconnected from the rest of the page and from 
the rest of the edition.  Id.  GPO presents the articles within the context of the page, but 
disconnected from surrounding pages, the rest of the Sunday Magazine, and the rest of the 
newspaper.  Id. at 501. 
 97. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505.  The publishers and Dissent argue that it will be both difficult and 
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not a foregone conclusion, and policy considerations such as these are 
better suited for Congressional lawmaking.98  The Court remanded the 
remedies issue back to the district court for hearing and decision.99 
The majority concluded that the databases did not constitute 
revisions under §201(c).100  Therefore, the electronic publishers 
infringed the freelance authors’ copyrights by reproducing the articles in 
the databases, and the print publishers infringed the authors’ copyrights 
by authorizing the electronic publishers to do so.101 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Defining “Revision” 
Tasini gave the courts an opportunity, once again, to try their hand 
at interpreting the notoriously imprecise language of a federal statute.102  
                                                                                                                                 
costly for the print and electronic publishers to locate and contract with each individual author of 
the numerous freelance articles in the databases.  Id. at 520.  Without express authorization, the 
publishers are left vulnerable to potential statutory damages for infringement.  Id.  Publishers may 
find it more economically feasible to purge their databases of all existing freelance articles and 
demand a complete transfer of copyright in future freelance articles.  Id.  Consequently, the 
freelancers would be in the same unfair position as before the 1976 Copyright Act where they lost 
the copyright to contributions to collective works.  Id.  Further, the wholesale deletion of freelance 
articles defeats the underlying benefits that electronic databases provide to society: efficiency, 
accuracy and comprehensiveness.  Id.  This threat, if realized, would defeat copyright law’s basic 
purpose of promoting the general welfare through access to new works.  Id. 
 98. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06.  “Speculation about future harms is no basis for this Court to 
shrink the authorial rights congress has established in § 201(c).”  Id.  The Court reassured the parties 
that, “it hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these 
articles in the databases (much less all freelance articles in any databases) must issue.”  Id. at 505, 
citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994) (a court may enjoin infringement); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (goals of copyright law are “not always best served by automatically 
granting injunctive relief”).  The Court speculated that the parties may enter into blanket licensing 
agreements that would enable the publishers to continue using the works while the authors are 
compensated for the use of the works.  Id. at 505; see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1979) (discussing blanket licensing and consent decrees).  
Further the Court pointed out that numerous other nations, applying their own copyright laws,  
concluded electronic database reproduction and distribution of freelance works violate copyrights of 
the freelancers.  Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506, citing Union Syndicale des Journalistes Franais v. SDV 
Plurimdia (T.G.I., Strasbourg, Fr., Feb. 3, 1998), in Lodging of International Federation of 
Journalism as Amicus Curiae; S.C.R.L. Cent. Station v. Ass’n Generale des Journalistes 
Professionnels de Beligique (CA, Brussels, Belg., 9e ch., Oct. 28, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22 
COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 177, 195 (1998); Heg v. De Volkskrant B.V. (Dist. Ct., Amsterdam, 
Neth., Sept. 24, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22 COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 177, 181. 
 99. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see Copyright Act of 1976,  17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2002). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Tasini rested on how the Court chose 
to define “revision” as found in §201(c) of the Copyright Act.103  Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, used Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary to define “revision” as “a new ‘version,’ and a 
version is, in this setting, a ‘distinct form of something regarded by its 
creators or others as one work.’”104  Each court that examined this issue 
agreed that a revision is inherently different from the original work; but 
each also agreed it must still be recognizable as a version of the original 
work.105 
The Supreme Court’s inquiry into whether the articles were 
republished as “part of” a “‘revision’. . . focus[ed] on the Articles as 
presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the Databases.”106  The 
Court repeatedly struck down the publishers’ arguments with the same 
dual edged sword: “. . .the user sees the article clear of the context 
provided by the original periodical edition or any revision. . .” and, “. . . 
the databases do not perceptibly reproduce articles as ‘part of’ the 
collective work. . . or as part of any ‘revision’ thereof.”107  Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (“In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights 
under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the 
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular work, any 
revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.”) (emphasis 
added).  Supreme Court also looked to the legislative history of the 1976 Act that indicated the 
owner of the preexisting work would continue to have the right to sue for infringement even after 
that work was incorporated into a derivative or collective work.  Smith, supra note 42, at 1104, 
citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
 104. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500, citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1944, 2545 (1976). 
 105. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; Tasini v. New York Times, Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Tasini v. New York Times, Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Greenberg v. National 
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).  A “revision” can be quite different from the 
original but must still be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collective work to be fairly 
called a revision of “that collective work.”  17 U.S.C. § 201(c); see Tasini, 972 F. Supp at 820.  If 
the alleged revision is not recognizable as a version of the original, it is inherently a completely new 
work.  See Id.  This new work would not be protected under the § 201(c) “revision” privilege 
because the legislative history of the 1976 Act clearly states, a “publishing company could reprint a 
contribution form one issue in a later issue of its magazine and could reprint an article from a 1980 
edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution 
itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738. 
 106. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499, citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (stating copyright protection exists in 
original works fixed in any medium “from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated”); § 101 (defining “copies” as material objects in which a work is fixed from which 
the work can be perceived, and “fixed” as sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived).  See also Alice Haemmerli, Symposium on Electronic Rights in International 
Perspective, Commentary: Tasini v. New York Times Co., 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129 
(1998) (noting Court’s focus on perception in interpreting 1976 Act). 
 107. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500.  The Court summarily concluded that the articles were 
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Court concluded the databases were not recognizable versions of the 
original periodical editions.108 
Although the Supreme Court ultimately reached a just decision 
using context and perception as a standard, it failed to adequately 
address the real issue: What qualifies as a “revision,” or rather when is a 
work a recognizable version of the original?109  Following the Court’s 
analysis, if an article is presented in context, it is a revision; if it is not 
presented in context, then it is not a revision.110  However, presentation 
and arrangement are not the sole defining characteristics of a collective 
work.111  In Feist, the Supreme Court held that the selection, 
arrangement, and coordination of the underlying components make a 
collective work unique and recognizable.112  A court should look to a 
collective work’s selection, arrangement, and coordination when 
determining whether the work is a recognizable “revision” of the 
original periodical.113  Therefore, a database may be deemed a “revision” 
if it retains recognizable selection, recognizable arrangement, or 
                                                                                                                                 
neither “part of” the original work, nor “part of” a “revision” of the original work because they are 
presented to the users “clear of the context provided by the original periodical editions or by any 
revision of those editions.”  Id.  The Court used lack of context to strike down the publisher’s 
argument that the databases were “revisions” of the original periodical, and the publisher’s 
argument that the databases were akin to microfiche, which is a permissible use under the doctrine 
of media neutrality.  Id. 
 108. See id.; see text supra Part III.D. 
 109. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483. 
 110. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500. 
 111. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding compilations 
of fact are copyrightable, but a telephone directory, arranged in traditional alphabetical order, was 
not copyrightable due to lack of minimal creative spark required for compilation copyright).  The 
Court reasoned that a compilation is not copyrightable per se, but is copyrightable only if the 
underlying components have been “selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”  Id. at 356, citing 17 U.S.C. § 
101. 
 112. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.  See also, Bell South Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Info. 
Pub. Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding BAPCO’s selection of headings and arrangement 
of business listings under those headings made the yellow pages sufficiently original), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1101 (1994); Key Pub., Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enterprises, 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 
1991) (holding Key directory is original because of the selection of businesses to include and the 
arrangement of the listings under unique headings); Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning 
From the Past in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.  879, 879 (2001) (discussing “pre-modern” 
copyright cases protection of databases). 
 113. See Tasini v. New York Times Co, 972 F. Supp. 804, 820 (1997).  Publishers are not 
allowed to revise the freelance authors contributions to the collective work, so the only parts of a 
collective work that can be “revised” are the elements of selection, coordination, and arrangement 
that the collective authors contributed to make it original.  Id.  It is this original contribution that 
gives a collective work its unique character, which makes it identifiable as “that collective work.”  
Id.  Thus to determine whether something is a revision, one should look to the original contributions 
of the author.  Id. 
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recognizable coordination.114 
The Tasini Court admittedly focused on the arrangement and 
presentation of the articles to database users.115  The Court correctly 
found that the electronic databases do not contain any recognizable 
arrangement from the periodicals.116  Based on this fact, the Court 
summarily declared that the databases were not recognizable revisions 
under §201(c).117  However, the Court’s analysis overlooked the 
publisher’s selection, only looking at the arrangement and coordination 
of the electronic databases through “context.”118  As a result of this leap 
in reasoning, the Court ignores the very real possibility that selection 
alone may render a database a recognizable “revision” of a print 
periodical.119 
                                                                                                                                 
 114. See supra notes 112-13; Key Pub., 945 F.2d at 513 (stating compilation only needs 
original selection, coordination, “or” arrangement); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining compilation as a 
work formed by assembling preexisting materials that are selected, coordinated, “or” arranged in 
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work). 
 115. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 (‘[W]e focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, 
the user of the Databases.”). 
 116. Id. at 500.  “When a user conducts a search, each article appears as a separate item within 
the search result.”  Id.  Articles also appear without graphics, formatting, or other articles with 
which the article was initially published.  Id. 
 117.   Id. 
 118. See id.; Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 142 (“Because the arrangement of the publishers’ 
works is completely lost in the Lexis/Nexis context, the sole issue with regard to Lexis/Nexis is 
whether the selection of the component parts is recognizable online, thereby qualifying the 
electronic publication as a ‘revision’ of the collective work.”); Dixon, supra note 6, at n.47 (district 
court never acknowledged that NEXIS contains thousands of articles never selected by the 
publishers of the New York Times); Hicks, supra note 42, at 1006 (noting it is unfortunate that 
subjective selection receives limited application). 
 119. Ethan R. York, Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.: Continuing the Stable 
Uncertainty of Copyright in Factual Compilations, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 584 (1999) 
(noting originality must be found in the compilers selection or arrangement; there need not be 
originality found in each aspect of the work); Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (“Once a court uncovers 
elements of a databases that reflect subjectivity in their selection, copyright protection follows, 
regardless of their arrangement or location.”).  See also, Russell G. Nelson, Seeking Refuge From A 
Technology Storm: The Current Status of Database Protection Legislation After the Sinking of the 
Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act and the Second Circuit Affirmation of Matthew Bender 
& Co. v. West Publishing Co., 6 J. INTELL. PROP L. 453 (1999) (discussing copyright originality in 
compilations).  Although arrangement and coordination are lost, there is no compelling reason why 
a collection of digital files corresponding to a single edition of the New York Times, standing alone 
cannot constitute a “revision” of that day’s New York Times because selection is retained.  See 
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For example, should the New York Times be 
forbidden from selling a CD-ROM that contains just today’s paper to customers who want to read 
the Times on their computer?  See id.  This CD-ROM may have a search function to take John Doe 
directly to the sports scores, and would likely present the articles individually, clear of the context 
of the rest of the paper, yet, is this CD-ROM anything less than the February 11, 2002 New York 
Times in a new format?  See id.  The CD-ROM is, in the Supreme Court’s own words, “a new 
‘version,’ and a version is, in this setting, a ‘distinct form of something regarded by its creators or 
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Unfortunately for the publishers, utilizing selection, in addition to 
arrangement, as a basis for recognizing a work as a revision does not 
change the results of this case.120  The New York Times is independently 
recognized for its selection of articles.121  However, the Court should 
have examined each database’s subjective selection to see if it was 
similar to the New York Times’ selection, thus rendering the database a 
recognizable revision.122 
1.  NEXIS 
The subjective selection that goes into NEXIS is fundamentally 
different from the selection made by the New York Times publishers.123  
The Times publishers decide which articles will be included in “All the 
News That’s Fit to Print.”124  On the other hand, the NEXIS publishers 
are choosing which periodicals will be included in their database.125  
Once the NEXIS publishers decide to include the New York Times in 
their database, the inclusion of the individual articles is no longer an 
original defining characteristic because NEXIS is merely trying to be as 
comprehensive as possible.126  Therefore, NEXIS’ selection of whole 
                                                                                                                                 
others as one work.’”  Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500. 
 120. See text infra Part IV.A.1-3; Hicks, supra note 42, at 1006 (recognizing that subjective 
selection typically extends only to small compilations because of the selectivity that goes into 
“winnowing” a potentially large compilation down into a smaller one). 
 121. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J. Dissenting), citing Tasini v. New York Times, Co., 
975 F. Supp. 804, 823 (1993) (“The New York Times perhaps even represents the paradigm, the 
epitome of a publication in which selection alone reflects sufficient originality to merit copyright 
protection.”). 
 122. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 143 (arguing selection is not preserved in NEXIS 
because the user must take proactive steps to recreate an edition before it is in fact recognizable as 
the same selection); Greenberg v. National Geographic Society, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(comparing electronic magazine archive to original magazine); Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (comparing 
third party electronic databases with print periodicals); Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying § 201(c) revision privilege to copying of individual articles). 
 123. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025.  Copyright for a compilation may be based on the 
author’s subjective selection of preexisting material.  Id.  However, the contents of many databases 
may not reflect the necessary creative subjectivity because the data is amassed based on objective 
criteria that are not creative enough to reveal originality.  See id.  Most compilations are defined by 
their comprehensiveness and usually contain selections based on objective, not subjective criteria.  
Id. at 1006.  However, even large compilations may reflect subjectivity in decisions made in their 
creation.  Id. (arguing large compilations should be given equal protection under subjective 
selection doctrine as small compilations). 
 124. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 515 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting importance of New York 
Times selection process). 
 125. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (“Courts should scrutinize carefully the components of 
the databases, isolating those elements that reflect particular judgmental decisions by the  database 
author from those elements that are purely objective and noncreative.”). 
 126. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (arguing that because the nature of a database system 
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periodicals is not recognizable as the same selection the New York 
Times makes because NEXIS is not making any subjective selection of 
particular articles.127  Conversely, the New York Times is not making 
any subjective selection of other periodical titles to include in the 
Times.128  Therefore, the subjective selection that goes into NEXIS is not 
recognizable as the same subjective selection that goes into a particular 
edition of the New York Times.129 
2.  General Periodicals OnDisc CD-ROM (GPO) 
As previously noted, the New York Times is defined by its 
subjective selection of individual articles for a particular day’s paper.130  
GPO, on the other hand, is defined by its selection of general 
periodicals, including the New York Times’ Sunday Book Review and 
Magazine.131  Like NEXIS, once GPO makes the decision to include a 
periodical, it wants all of the articles in that periodical so that its 
                                                                                                                                 
makes the most comprehensive systems the most useful, the subjective selection doctrine will not 
give the database originality).  See also, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991) (holding phone company did not make subjective selection by including all of its 
“subscribers” in its phone book).  If including all of something is an objective selection, then 
NEXIS’ inclusion of all of the New York Times articles is an objective selection.  See id.  
Consequently, the New York Times’ subjective selection is not preserved in the electronic database.  
See id.  Contra Tasini, 533 U.S. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing New York Times’ selection 
is preserved by NEXIS database). 
 127. See supra note 126; Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; Sims, supra note 53, at 9.  The New York 
Times’ contracts with the electronic databases were licenses to publish the complete text of 
newspaper and magazine editions.  Sims, supra note 53, at 9.  The publishers delivered each 
edition’s text to the databases as electronic files that would be uploaded into the database.  Id.  The 
database wanted the complete text and its contracts mirrored this desire.  Id. 
 128. See id.  The New York Times was fully aware that its periodicals were going to be 
included in a database that contained numerous other periodicals.  Id.  The Times’ was primarily 
concerned with its contractual duty to send the text of the daily edition to the databases, and the 
databases’ payment for such a license.  Id. 
 129. See supra notes 120-28 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic).  
Users reference particular works because of the publisher’s subjective selection.  Cf. Haemmerli, 
supra note 93, at 142-43 (noting perception of the user is important in determining recognizability 
of a work as a revision).  A user searches NEXIS because of the numerous reputable periodicals the 
NEXIS publishers select to include in its database. Id.  On the other hand, a user reads the New 
York Times for the articles that are selected by its renowned editors.  Id.  A user is drawn to NEXIS 
because of the periodicals it selects, and the user is drawn to the New York Times because of the 
articles it selects.  Id.  The respective publisher’s selection is an integral part of how the work is 
perceived.  Id.  The 1976 Act includes perception as an important part of copyright protection.  Id. 
at 143.  This is seen in the Act’s requirement that a work be “fixed” such that it can be perceived; 
and the defining of copyrightable subject matter as, “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium from which they can be perceived.”  Id., citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(defining fixation 
requirement); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining copyrightable subject matter). 
 130. See supra notes 120-29 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic). 
 131. Id. 
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database will be comprehensive.132  Users are drawn to GPO because of 
the diverse periodicals it selects to include in the database, but users read 
the New York Times for the articles selected.133  The subjective 
selection made by GPO is not recognizable as the subjective selection 
made for a particular edition of the New York Times.134 
3.  New York Times OnDisc (NYTO) 
NYTO’s only subjective selection was picking its topic as the New 
York Times.135  Once UMI decided to publish a CD-ROM of the New 
York Times, they did not subjectively select articles to include in its 
database; rather they merely wanted to compile every New York Times 
article to make their database comprehensive.136  NYTO’s subjective 
selection is not recognizable as the same subjective selection made for 
an issue of the New York Times.137 
Consequently, even using subjective selection as an additional 
foothold for finding a subsequent work to be a revision, each of the three 
databases fail to be recognizable versions of the original New York 
Times.138 
B.  Microfiche and Media Neutrality 
The publishers attempted to analogize the electronic databases to 
microfilm or microfiche, a permissible adaptation of print periodicals.139  
NEXIS and GPO are easily distinguished from microfiche because the 
databases include material from numerous sources while microfiche is 
usually seen as an archive of a single periodical.140  NYTO, on the other 
                                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra notes 120-29 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See text and notes supra Part IV.A.1-3. 
 139. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 500 (2001).  Microfiche is an 
acceptable use or modification of a work because the 1976 Act is intended to maintain media 
neutrality.  Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write Stuff For Copyright Law?, 27 
CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 878 (1999).  The legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress 
wanted to extend copyright to new media.  Id.  An example of media neutrality in the 1976 Act is its 
“defining of ‘copies’ to include ‘any method now known or later developed, and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.’”  Id., citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”). 
 140. See Hur, supra note 35, at 87 n.218 (arguing NEXIS cannot be a revision because articles 
do not have to be retrieved with other articles from that particular edition).  In fact, the New York 
Times actually forbids NEXIS from producing “facsimile reproductions of the particular editions.”  
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hand, is more easily viewed as resembling microfiche because both 
contain past editions of a single periodical.141 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Copyright Act embodies 
the concept of media neutrality; “that the transfer of a work between 
media does not alter the character of that work for copyright 
purposes.”142  However, the Court rejected the microfiche analogy 
because “unlike the conversion of newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of 
articles to the Databases does not represent a mere conversion of intact 
periodicals (or revisions of periodicals) from one medium to another.”143  
The Court went on to reject the publisher’s argument that these 
differences were necessitated by the medium.144  However, in a world of 
emerging digital technology, the Court dismissed the concept of media 
neutrality too quickly.145  A computer file containing the entire text of 
                                                                                                                                 
Id. at 90 n.253, citing Tasini v. New York Times, Co. 206 F.3d 161, 169 (1999). 
 141. See Hur, supra note 35, at 87 n.219 (stating UMI database, NYTO,  presents a more 
difficult issue than NEXIS because it only contains articles from one publisher).  NYTO is “akin to 
an anthology of all editions of the New York Times.”  Id.  However, NYTO cannot be a revision 
because a new anthology would be a new collective work that exceeds the scope of the § 201(c) 
privilege.  Id.  The § 201(c) privilege is limited to “revisions” of “that collective work,” not entirely 
new collective works or anthologies.  Id.  See also, Kia L. Freeman, Tasini v. New York Times: 
Wrong Issue, Wrong Presumption, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 841 (1999) (arguing the district court 
missed the issue in its decision by asking if the databases were substantially similar to the original 
collective work, while the proper issue was: in light of the original contributions of the author to the 
collective work, is the underlying work being used in a revision of that collective work or in an 
entirely different collective work; and concluding CD-ROMs are revisions, but NEXIS is not). 
 142. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502.  See also, Deborah Tussey, The Creative Enemy of the True: The 
Meaning of Originality in the Matthew Bender Cases, 5 RICH. L.J. & TECH. 10, at n.75 (1999) 
(“discussing how Congress intentionally drafted the definition of “copies”  to avoid technology 
specific readings of the [copyright] statute and achieve media neutrality.”); Matthew Bender & Co. 
v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing media neutrality in context of online 
databases); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing 
media neutrality while denying copyright protection for pagination of West reporters); Sims, supra 
note 53, at 14 (“media-neutrality. . . seems to require that § 201(c) be construed either to allow 
publishers to make whatever is available on paper and in microfilm available in electronic media as 
well, or to compel them to halt and purge even the microfilm republication of their works.”). 
 143. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502; see also, Brief for Amici Curiae American Intell. Prop. Law 
Assoc., at 2001 WL 22982, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) 
(arguing, in support of neither party, that mere conversion of a collective work from one medium to 
another is a reproduction that is within the rights of a publisher under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, 
however, such a conversion is not a permitted “revision” if each separate contribution is stripped 
from the collective work). 
 144. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502; see Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write 
Stuff For Copyright Law?, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 878 (1999).  Publishers argued that the change 
in the medium is irrelevant because § 201(c) allows “revisions” without limitation to the nature or 
type of revision.  See Forhan, supra, at 878. 
 145. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sims, supra note 53, at 14 
(arguing media-neutrality is fundamental concept of 1976 Act which must be addressed in analysis 
of electronic publishing). 
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the February 22, 2002 New York Times would be large enough to create 
problems on underpowered computers, and long enough to make reader 
navigation nearly impossible.146  Therefore, at some point it is 
reasonable for electronic publishers to break a larger collective work into 
sub-files for logistical reasons.147 
Regardless, media neutrality does not justify a publisher’s selling of 
articles individually, separate from the rest of the collective work.148  
The proper way to create an electronic “revision” of a work would be to 
place an entire pages worth of articles in one file, and provide links to 
“flip” to the next page or section of the collective work.149 
C.  Transferability of §201(c) privilege 
The Supreme Court did not address the transferability of the 
§201(c) privilege because it found that the electronic databases were not 
revisions of the freelance articles, and thus not part of the privilege in the 
first place.150  However, as time passes, print works will continue to be 
archived in electronic databases, many of which, with the help of 
technological advances, will be deemed “revisions” under §201(c).151  
Therefore, it is important to note that the privilege accorded publishers 
in §201(c) is amenable to a nontransferable, non-exclusive license.152 
                                                                                                                                 
 146. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Just as a paper version of the 
New York Times is divided into sections and pages in order to facilitate the reader’s navigation and 
manipulation of large batches of newsprint, so too the decision to subdivide the electronic version of 
that collective work into individual article files facilitates the reader’s use of the electronic 
information.”).  Id. at 513 n.19 (“An ASCII version of the October 31, 2000, New York Times, 
which contains 287 articles, would fill over 500 printed pages.”). 
 147. See Sims, supra note 53, at 14.  It is hypocritical to allow publishers to offer complete 
photographic copies of their issues on microfilm, but not allow them to offer text only copies of the 
articles, which represent the bulk of the work, in electronic form.  Id.  Eventually, technology may 
allow documents to be presented electronically in a photographic format like microfilm but until 
then the medium necessitates the work be broken down into feasible units.  Id. 
 148. See Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding infringement of 
freelance author’s copyright when defendant, with permission of collective publisher, copied and 
sold author’s article separately from the collective work as a whole). 
 149. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority’s focus on the GPO’s 
inability to flip to the next page is nothing more than a criticism of the databases’ medium-driven 
need to divide the periodicals into smaller units.  Id. 
 150. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 494 (stating databases are not privileged revisions of the print 
periodicals, so “we find it unnecessary to determine whether the privilege is transferable”). 
 151. See text supra Part IV.B. (“Microfiche and Media Neutrality”).  Technological advances 
will likely allow electronic databases to be revisions in the future.  Id. 
 152. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 477-48 (interpreting Copyright Act to say, absent a written 
agreement, or an employee/employer relationship, the publisher can only obtain a non-exclusive 
license to publish  which is merely “permission” or a “right” to publish); Haemmerli, supra note 93, 
at 137-38 (“[G]iven the doctrinal history of copyright indivisibility and similar doctrine in the 
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Section 201 grants a freelance author complete ownership of his 
works, and absent evidence of an express transfer of rights, only grants 
publishers (collective authors) a limited “privilege” to publish the 
author’s work “as part of that particular collective work, any revision of 
that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.”153  
The term “privilege” is only used three times in the 1976 Act.154  The 
canons of statutory construction teach that the same words used in the 
same statute should be given the same meaning.155  In §109(d) and 
§111(d), “privilege” is used to refer to a non-exclusive license.156  
Consequently the “privilege” in §201(c) should be construed as a non-
exclusive license.157 
By definition, ownership of copyright is not “transferred” by a non-
exclusive license.158  Rather, a non-exclusive license merely gives the 
                                                                                                                                 
adjacent patent field, as well as the revisions to the concept of copyright transfers that were 
occurring at the same time as the drafting of Section 201(c), it is more plausible to equate the 
privilege with a non-exclusive (and therefore non-transferable) license. . .”). 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002).  See Gordon, supra note 48, at 491 (discussing transferability 
of § 201(c) privilege); Santelli, supra note 21, at 288 (interpreting § 201(c)’s privilege with respect 
to collective works, and concluding if only the first sentence was present, the authors would 
undoubtedly win; however, the second sentence gives the publishers certain privileges whose scope 
has yet to be determined). 
 154. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (collective author is “presumed to have acquired only the privilege 
of reproducing and distributing the contribution. . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (“privileges prescribed by 
subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who 
has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecords”); 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (referring to fee that 
must be paid for the “privilege” of re-transmitting conventional television broadcasts). 
 155. Geoffrey P Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 
1179, 1183 (1990) (“The same words used in the same statute should be taken to have the same 
meanings.”). 
 156. Patrick J. O’Connor, On-Line Computer Databases and CD-ROMS are Not the Electronic 
Equivalent of Microfilm: Tasini v. New York Times Co., Electronic Revisions, and Individual 
Contributions to Collective Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 521, 544 
(1998).  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(d); 17 U.S.C. § 111(d). 
 157. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), with 17 U.S.C. § 109(d), and 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).  See 
Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 135-38.  The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act changed § 201(c) 
from a transfer of a “right” to a mere “privilege” to publish a contribution in a collective work.  Id. 
at 136.  Courts must decide whether this privilege is a proprietary interest, and thus transferable, or 
merely a permit to use the underlying work.  Id. at 137.  A “privilege” is defined as, “a particular 
and peculiar benefit or advantage. . .[which] exempts one from liability which he would otherwise 
be required to perform. . .”  Id. at 137, citing BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY at 1197 (1990).  The use of 
the term “privilege” in contradistinction to the “express transfer of proprietary rights” favors 
treating the privilege like a non-exclusive license without a proprietary interest.  Id.  Additionally, § 
201(c), which was modified to counteract the doctrine of indivisibility, would not give away a 
proprietary right without the express assent of the author.  Id.  Therefore, it is most plausible to 
equate the § 201(c) privilege with a non-exclusive, non-transferable license.  Id. at 138. 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, 
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of 
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, 
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licensee permission to use the work.159  Logically, the licensee cannot 
transfer a non-exclusive license because he does not technically own 
anything.160  A tangible example of this principle is a friend you invite 
has permission to come to dinner, but he cannot transfer that privilege to 
a random third party.161  Consequently, the publisher of a collective 
work cannot transfer his §201(c) privilege to a third party electronic 
publisher.162 
In Tasini, the “transferability” issue renders the electronic databases 
infringements regardless of the Court’s decision on the “revision” 
issue.163  The publishers and the courts are therefore destined to 
formulate a real world remedy for transferring electronic rights.164 
                                                                                                                                 
but not including a non-exclusive license.”). 
 159. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 137.  The linguistic distinction between the § 201(c) 
“privilege” and a “right” is a indicator of the legislative intent to eliminate the doctrine of 
indivisibility, which had the effect of involuntarily transferring rights.  Id. at 136.  The legislative 
history shows § 201(c) was labeled a privilege because there should not be a presumption of transfer 
of ownership in the absence of an express transfer.  Id.  Rather Congress only intended to presume a 
“privilege” was given to the collective author.  Id.  If the privilege is a permit to use a work, and not 
a proprietary interest, then it is non-transferable.  Id. at 137.  However, if the privilege carried a 
proprietary interest, then it was transferable by the collective author.  Id.  In light of the legislative 
history discouraging the involuntary transfer of a proprietary interest, it is safe to assume the 
“privilege” is merely a permit to use the work.  Id.  Therefore, the § 201(c) “concept of a privilege is 
similar to that of a non-exclusive license, which provided permission to use a property free of 
liability, but does not convey an ownership interest in that property.” Id. 
 160. Josh J. May, Intellectual Property Tasini v. New York Times Co., 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 
13, 24 (2001) (“In copyright law,  a non-exclusive license is non-transferable.”).  Courts apply § 
201(c) to give collective authors some minimal privileges in the absence of an express transfer of 
copyright, not to give them exclusive rights for which they did not bargain.  Id. at 25.  Compare 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 473, 491 (2000).  To hold the § 201(c) privilege completely inalienable would be 
overbroad because anytime a publishing company is sold, no § 201(c) privilege would adhere to the 
collective works sold with it.  Id.  If the § 201(c) privilege were completely not transferable, the 
buyer of an encyclopedia title could not reprint the encyclopedias because it would be infringing the 
underlying author’s reproduction rights.  Id. at 492  The logical solution to these absurd results 
comes from interpreting “the owner of copyright in the collective work” as a status position, rather 
than an individual, so when copyright ownership of the collective work changes hands, the privilege 
changes hands as well.  Id. 
 161. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 492.  (“Some bare licenses are fully alienable (e.g. a typical 
movie ticket), but some are inalienable (e.g. the invitation from one friend to another to ‘drop in 
Tuesday night’)”). 
 162. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 138 (arguing doctrine and legislative history support 
treating § 201(c) privilege as a non-exclusive license).  Contra Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 
F. Supp. 804, (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding § 201(c) privilege a subdivision of a ‘right’  and thus 
transferable under § 201(d)), citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (“Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be 
transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.”). 
 163. See text and notes supra Part IV.C. (arguing § 201(c) privilege is not transferable, and 
therefore electronic databases are infringements of authors’ copyrights); Tasini, 533 U.S. 483. 
 164. See Id. at 506 (remanding remedial issues to district court). 
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D.  Consequences and Solutions for the Future 
The Publishers persisted that a finding for the Authors would 
“punch gaping holes” in the electronic record of history when electronic 
publishers were required to delete unauthorized freelance articles from 
their databases.165  However, the Supreme Court said “it hardly follows 
from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these 
Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any 
database) must issue.”166  The Court continued by saying the parties 
“may enter into an agreement allowing continued electronic 
reproduction of the Author’s works; they (sic), and if necessary the 
courts and Congress, may draw on numerous models for distributing 
copyrighted works and remunerating authors for their distribution.”167  
The Court then remanded the remedial issues back to the district court 
for initial airing and decision.168  
Omission of freelance articles from electronic collections, on any 
scale, would undermine the primary benefits that electronic databases 
provide researchers and the public.169  However, Congress does not need 
to step in immediately to protect public access to freelance works 
                                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. at 504 (majority dismissing publishers policy argument); see also, Brief of Amici 
Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 22914, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that removing freelance articles form internet would be 
devastating to the electronic record and impede public access to valuable information). 
 166. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505, citing 17 USC § 502(a) (court “may” enjoin infringement); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (noting goals of copyright law are 
“not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief”). 
 167. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 118(b); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S 1, 4-6, 10-12 (1979) (recounting history of blanket music licensing 
regimes and consent decrees governing their operation).  The Court refused to let speculation about 
future harms shrink the author’s enumerated rights established by Congress in § 201(c).  Tasini, 533 
U.S. at 505-06.  The Court was reluctant to establish a remedial scheme because “Congress can 
determine the nature and scope of the problem and fashion on (sic) appropriate licensing remedy far 
more easily than can courts.”  Id. at 520 n.18, (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing 17 U.S.C. § 108(d)(1).  
After the author’s win in the Second Circuit, Plaintiff Tasini even urged publishers to negotiate 
licenses with freelance authors so as to avoid further litigation.  Hur, supra note 35, at n.263. 
 168. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506. 
 169. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Electronic archives benefit 
researchers through efficiency, accuracy, and comprehensiveness.  Id. Digital technology offers 
society unprecedented access to vast amounts of information in a searchable format.  See Atteritano, 
supra note 5, at 378; Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Super Highway”: 
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1995); Sheldon 
W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 571 
(2001); Dixon, supra note 6, at 127; April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another 
Challenge: The Electronic Frontier of the World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
75, 76 (1998); John D. Shuff & Gregory T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON 
L. REV. 555, 557 (2001); David J. Loundy, Revision the Copyright Law for Electronic Publishing, 
14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (1995). 
31
Radefeld: New York Times v. Tasini
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
RADEFELD1.DOC 5/5/03  12:09 PM 
576 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:545 
because there are alternative, less intrusive solutions to achieve 
copyright’s goals.170  Now that the Court has clarified who owns 
electronic rights, the parties can individually contract for these rights, or 
establish Collective Rights Organizations (CRO).171  If neither of these 
less intrusive options is successful in furthering copyright’s primary goal 
of promoting the public welfare, then Congress should step in and 
establish a compulsory licensing system.172  This Note now examines 
                                                                                                                                 
 170. Freeman, supra note 141, at 875 (discussing appropriate way for copyright law to deal 
with novel issues).  In the early days of a new issue, it is inappropriate to pass new legislation.  Id.  
The proper way to discover the boundaries of new rights is through trial and error.  Id.  First, 
interested parties use whatever devices or techniques are available to them, including contractual 
arrangements, to stake a claim on the new unregulated right.  Id.  Then, after interested parties make 
the first moves, the law can step in and recognize an official method of control over the new right.  
Id., citing Ejan MacKaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet, in THE 
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 13, 19-21 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed. 1996).  
See also, Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405-409 (arguing for the use of contract and collective 
societies to solve digital dilemma).  Contracting is the “ultimate solution” to the controversy if both 
sides are willing to enter into meaningful negotiation and compromise.  Id. at 405.  The “future 
solution” is utilization of “copyright clearing centers,” which will assist in easing the parties’ 
concerns about straight contracting.  Id. at 406.  The United Kingdom is a real world example where 
these less intrusive solutions proved to be a “thriving industry for the marketing of copyrighted 
works.”  Forhan, supra note 144, at 882. 
 171. See Forhan, supra note 144, at 882.  Collective rights organizations act as middlemen or 
brokers of the copyrighted material.  Id.  The CRO’s compile individual works and sell licenses to 
customers, which permit them to use the work in exchange for a fee.  Id. This simplifies the 
licensing process while allowing authors to retain a more powerful voice in the control and 
dissemination of their works.  Id.  The National Writer’s Union established the Publication Rights 
Clearinghouse (PRC) to administer collective licensing of freelance work, and digitally process 
permission payments.  See Hur, supra note 35, at 91 n.267.  The PRC licenses to publishers and 
databases non-exclusive rights to its inventory of articles and books.  Id.  The PRC enrolls authors 
who own the secondary rights to their works and places their works into the PRC inventory.  Id.  
The entire PRC repertoire is then licensed to publishers, who collect and pay PRC fees for the use of 
the PRC author’s works.  Id.  PRC then distributes this money to its member authors for the use of 
their works.  Id.  See also, Publication Rights Clearinghouse of the National Writers Union, 
available at http://www.nwu.org/prc/prchome.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) (giving details about 
Publication Rights Clearinghouse).  An alternative organization is the Author’s Registry, established 
by the Author’s Guild and The American Society of Journalists and Authors.  Jason Williams, Court 
Decision for Freelancers Could Leave Gaps in Archives, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 2, 1999, at 5.  
The Author’s Registry locates authors for publishers and will accept, and hold in trust, secondary 
use fees from publishers who want to use an author’s work but is having difficulty finding the 
author.  Id.  The Author’s Registry does not license the author’s works. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., 17. U.S.C. §§ 114-122 (establishing a compulsory licensing system for 
distribution and public performance of musical works).  Congress could alternatively step in and 
amend the 1976 Act to clarify the issue of electronic rights.  Smith, supra note 42, at 1124.  As seen 
in past federal copyright statutes, Congress has acted similarly in the past to resolve inconsistencies 
in copyright law.  Id. at 1127.  “[F]rom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. . .  [and] it has been Congress that has fashioned the 
new rules that new technology made necessary.”  Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 430 (1984); see also, Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write Stuff for 
Copyright Law?, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 865-67 (giving brief history of copyright law). 
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contracts, CRO’s, and compulsory licensing to see the benefits and 
drawbacks of using each method to transfer electronic rights.173 
1.  Contracts, Licenses, and New-Use Analysis 
The holding in Tasini leaves the parties free to modify their rights 
through contract.174  Publishers and authors are free to integrate 
electronic rights into their future contracts and licenses.175  In fact, many 
of the parties already began requiring freelancers to explicitly surrender 
the electronic rights to their submissions and some, like the New York 
Times, even require contributors to waive their rights retroactively as a 
condition for future publication.176  Every publisher will want to include 
such a grant of electronic rights in future contracts with freelance 
authors because in order for a grant of electronic rights to be effective, 
the contract or license must be clear, “in writing, and signed by the 
owner of the rights conveyed.”177 
                                                                                                                                 
 173. See text infra Part IV.D.1.-3. 
 174. See Sara Sadler Nelson, Practical Impact of Supreme Court Ruling on Author/Publisher 
Digital Use Concerns, ENT. L. AND FINANCE, Jul. 2001, at 1 (2001) (recognizing publishers can 
contractually alter the holding in Tasini).  However, the difficulty with contracting around the 
holding is retroactive licensing of works already in the databases because publishers would have to 
expend substantial resources to track down authors and negotiate licenses with them.  Hur, supra 
note 35, at 92 n.272; see Dixon, supra note 6, at 149 n.81 (noting freelance authors and publishers 
have historically created oral, ambiguous contracts that did not address electronic rights); Hur, 
supra note 35, at n.117 (describing contracts between authors and publishers). 
 175. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Nelson, supra note 174, at 1; 
Joanne Benoit Nakos, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the Rights Conveyed by 
Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L REV. 433, 446 (1995). 
 176. See Hur, supra note 35, at 65.  The decision against the publishers resulted in contracts 
allowing electronic publication of the author’s works without additional compensation for these 
rights.  Id.  “Some publishers negotiate additional fees with big-name authors.  Some publishers 
will not sign a contract without electronic rights.”  Id. at 68 n.29.  “All-rights” contracts are the 
norm with many publishers.  Id.  A freelancer who wants to publish repeatedly with the New York 
Times must give the company the privilege to include their article in electronic databases, and must 
agree to do so for every article that he ever published with the New York Times.  Nelson, supra 
note 174, at 1. 
 177. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 404.  Publishers have begun formalizing their contracts 
with freelancers since the Tasini case was filed in 1993.  Id.  Publishers have also made sure these 
new written contracts adequately addressed electronic rights.  Id.  Publishers have dual motives for 
demanding electronic rights in their new contracts: to prevent future litigation, and to get revenue 
from the electronic exploitation of their collective works.  Id.  See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“A transfer 
of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of 
conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the 
rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”).  If the grant is an exclusive license or 
assignment, it must be a clear expression of the intent of the parties to convey a copyright interest, 
in writing, and signed.  See Nelson, supra note 119.  The author may utilize a non-exclusive license 
to grant the publisher permission to use the work digitally, while the author retains all of his 
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Contract problems arise when new technologies emerge that were 
not explicitly contemplated by the contracting parties.178  Absent a 
complete transfer of rights to a work, the contracting parties are left 
unsure about who owns the rights to exploit the new use.179  Two 
schools of thought have emerged in doing this “New-Use” analysis: the 
Bartsch (preferred) approach, and the Cohen (strict) approach.180 
The Bartsch court adopted a broad approach that allows a licensee 
to pursue any uses that can reasonably be said to fall within the medium 
described in the license, including the “ambiguous penumbra” of the 
terms.181  This approach is “preferred” because it encourages the 
development of new media, thus benefiting society through access to 
protected works.182 
The Cohen Court adopted a narrower approach that refused to give 
licensees the rights to new media that were unforeseeable at the time of 
                                                                                                                                 
exclusive rights to the work.  Id.  But see, Smith, supra note 42, at 1107 (pointing out that defendant 
publishers often used oral contracts with little or no discussion over rights in the articles). 
 178. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968); Rey v. Lafferty, 990 
F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); SAPC, 
Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 921 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1990); Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.C. 1992); Landon v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir (1956); Kirke 
La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). 
 179. See supra note 181; Dixon, supra note 6, at 150 n.85 (discussing effect of new technology 
on intellectual property contracts).  The 1976 Act does not clearly define the rights of freelance 
authors in their works.  Forhan, supra note 144, at 864.  “This leaves the rights of the authors to be 
determined by the terms of their contracts with the publisher (if indeed such a contract exists), or by 
judicial interpretation of the extent of the publishers’ rights.”  Id. 
 180. See Sidney A. Rosenweig, Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s New-Use 
Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 916-20 (1995), 
citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 150, and Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851.  The Bartsch approach was coined the 
“preferred” approach by professor Nimmer.  3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT §10.10B, at 10-87 to 10-89 (1994) (discussing § 201(c) with respect to licensing).  
The Cohen approach was referred to as the “strict” approach because of its strict adherence to 
underlying contract principles.  Id.  See also, Nakos, supra note 175, at 446 (discussing Rey v. 
Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993), which utilized the Cohen approach); Atteritano, supra note 
5, at 388 (applying preferred and strict approaches to electronic publishing). 
 181. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 916; Nakos, supra note 175 
at 444; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 388. 
 182. See Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 918.  “Because new media are designed to improve 
the quality or facilitate the flow of information in society, efforts to encourage their development 
are in the pubic interest.”  Id.  See also, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984) (acknowledging the benefits of free flow of ideas, information and commerce); 
Information Infrastructure Task Force, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Preliminary Draft of the Report of 
the Working Group on Intellectual property Rights § IV(5) (July 1994) (“The Copyright Act exists 
for the benefit of the public.  To fulfill its constitutional purpose, the law should strive to make the 
information contained in protected works of authorship freely available.”). 
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contracting.183  The court reasoned that it is not fair to hold that the 
grantor impliedly gave up his rights when the “medium was ‘completely 
unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the 
bargain between the parties at the time of the original grant.”184 
Neither approach is without flaw, so parties continuously argue that 
the theory adopted by a particular court puts one party in an unfair 
position, or it defeats the underlying goals of copyright law.185  The 
solution for parties negotiating contracts and licenses is a future 
technologies clause that addresses “rights in the work now existing, or 
which may hereafter come into existence.”186  Inclusion of a future 
technologies clause eliminates most of the new-use confusion and can be 
dispositive evidence of who owns the future rights to a work.187  
However, many authors are hesitant to accept these future technologies 
clauses that grant “all rights” to the publisher because they feel forced 
into negotiating away rights that have a currently undetermined market 
value.188  However, this inherent risk in the transaction is no different 
                                                                                                                                 
 183. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851; see Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 919; Nakos, supra note 175, 
at 446-47. 
 184. Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 919, citing Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st. Cir. 
1993); see also, Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (reasoning licensee could not have bargained for rights of 
videocassette reproduction before the invention of the videocassette recorder); Kirke La Shelle Co. 
v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 15-66 (N.Y. 1933) (holding rights to make movie with sound 
were not part of agreement because technology to make motion pictures with sound was not yet 
invented at the time of contract). 
 185. Nakos, supra note 175, at 448 (discussing inherent flaws in both the Bartsch and Cohen 
approaches to New-use analysis); see also, Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 920 (examining Bartsch 
and Cohen). 
 186. Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of Multimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J.  351, 366 (1995).  The “now known or hereafter” clause has many adaptations such as 
“Author licenses the right to publish this article in all technologies now known or hereafter created”; 
or “Author reserves right to publish work in technologies not now known or that hereafter come into 
existence.”  See id. 
 187. See Saez, supra note 186, at 366 (noting tremendous impact future technology clauses 
have had in U.S. litigation); Cohen,  845 F.2d at 855.  But see, Saez, supra note 186, at n.113 
(“over-reliance on these clauses should certainly be avoided in the multimedia world of global 
markets and a border-less information superhighway.  It is entirely possible that these clauses may 
actually be unenforceable outside the United States, thus resulting in uneven enforcement of the 
clause to the detriment of all those involved in the multimedia venture.”). 
 188. Saez, supra note 186, at 366; see Dixon, supra note 6, at 130 n.12 (acknowledging print 
publications such as newspaper may unwittingly force freelance authors into unfavorable contracts); 
Sims, supra note 53, at 15 (“publishers have already begun demanding express written transfers of 
online rights from their freelance contributors without marginal increases in payments offered, and 
obtaining agreement to those terms.  Such demands will only become more prevalent.”).  If a 
freelance author will not sign the form contract that grants electronic rights to the publisher, the 
paper will simply commission the needed articles from another author “clamoring for publication.”  
Sims, supra note 53, at 14.  Publications have used a “take it or leave it” approach when negotiating 
these contracts.  Id.; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405.  Contracts that specifically grant the publisher 
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than the calculated risk an author assumes when he decides to sell his 
work outright.189  Additionally, “both parties may benefit if the future 
technology clause has been coupled with a provision specifying that the 
artist is to receive an ongoing percentage of the revenue stream 
regardless of the media utilized.”190 
The problem with individualized contracts and licenses is that they 
create the impossible task, which the New York Times faces, of hunting 
down thousands of past freelance authors and the immense 
administrative expense associated with individually negotiating licenses 
with each of them.191  Recognizing this burden, many publishers have 
opted to begin mass deletions of freelance articles from the electronic 
databases.192  As previously mentioned, the destruction of these 
databases defeats the efficiency, accuracy and comprehensiveness that 
electronic databases offer researchers and the public.193  Allowing 
publishers to delete freelance articles will inevitably reduce the public’s 
access to these works, which is contrary to copyright law’s goal of 
promoting the public welfare.194  Accordingly, the parties and the courts 
                                                                                                                                 
“all rights” in a work upset the “symbiotic relationship” between authors and publishers.  Shuff, 
supra note 8, at 566.  Authors and Publishers need each other.  Id.  They have historically 
participated in a give-and-take that efficiently distributes works and fairly compensates authors, but 
that balance is upset when publishers suddenly demand “all rights”  from the authors.  Id.  The 
authors are suddenly disenfranchised with respect to the dissemination of their works.  Id. 
 189. See Saez, supra note 186, at 366. 
 190. Id.  See Santelli, supra note 21, at 281-282 (arguing that payment contracts are the best 
solution because they maintain an incentive to authors by giving them continued income from their 
works while giving publishers the right to disseminate the works to the public); Smith, supra note 
42, at 1122 (“Other publishers, such as Publishers Weekly and the Nation, have followed Harper’s 
lead on sharing royalties with freelancers, while other magazines routinely pay a separate fee for 
electronic publishing.”) 
 191. Jeffery P. Weingart & Jill Westmoreland, Tasini Case May Set Back Freelancers, 
Publishers: To Avoid Expense, Publishers May Remove Existing Works From Online Publications, 
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at C3.  See May, supra note 160, at 26; Meitus, supra note 10, at 772-73. 
 192. See Sims, supra note 53, at 15.  Publishers are businessmen who will do a cost benefit 
analysis and follow the cheaper route regardless of the harm to the public’s access to works.  Id.  
Publishers prefer deleting the articles rather than “(a) spend the resources necessary to locate 
freelance writers of articles written over the past few decades, and (b) spend the resources necessary 
to come to acceptable terms with them.”  Id.; Tony Mauro, New York Times’ Response to Tasini 
Ruling is Inappropriate, Author’s Guild Charges, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Jul. 2001, at 9 (2001) 
(“Within minutes of the decision, New York Times Chairman and Publisher Arthur Sulzberg Jr. 
said the company would begin ‘the difficult and sad process of removing significant portions from 
its electronic historical archive.’”). 
 193. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 520 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Burns, et al. at 2001 WL 23641, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that a finding in favor of authors will both threaten the 
completeness of the electronic archives and decrease access to convenient and cost efficient means 
of comprehensive research). 
 194. May, supra note 160, at 26 (“. . . court. . . worr[ied] that not allowing publishers to 
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are searching for more efficient models of licensing works for electronic 
use.195 
2.  Collective Rights Organizations 
Collective Rights Organizations (CRO) alleviate the administrative 
inefficiency of individually contracting with numerous authors for 
secondary rights.196  Writers assign the CRO the right to act as their 
agent, and the CRO then offers publishers the non-exclusive right to use 
the work for a fee.197  Once the CRO has collected the fee, it distributes 
royalties to the author.198  A CRO can efficiently allocate royalties to 
freelance writers while keeping the electronic databases intact.199 
The problem with CRO’s is getting both sides to participate in the 
                                                                                                                                 
electronically distribute writers’ copyrighted articles would undermine the policy goal of ‘ensuring 
that collective works be marketed and distributed to the public.’”).  Not only will the pubic be 
injured by the removal of works from the databases, but the public will also suffer injury when 
online material decreases in quality.  Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405.  As publishers utilize “take it 
or leave it” contracts, inevitably some authors will “leave it” and the publishers will hire 
substandard authors to fill in the void.  Id.  Consequently, the public will lose access to some 
talented authors, and have to endure less talented writers with a “lower quality of work product.”  
Id. 
 195. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506 (remanding remedial issues back to the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York); Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 148 (“Most authors want their works 
to be distributed, and would willingly agree to license their electronic publication.  They simply 
want to be compensated for that publication.”); Mauro, supra note 192, at 9 (‘“‘The Supreme Court 
didn’t say the Times had to remove the articles, it said it had to pay for them . . .  The Court stressed 
that these issues could be resolved through licensing systems, such as that operated by the Author’s 
Registry.’”). 
 196. May, supra note 160, at 26-27 (“Commercial copyright transactions require negotiation, 
monitoring, and enforcement that can be prohibitively costly for individuals but feasible for a CRO.  
CRO’s, which flourish in the presence of new forms of media, devise general rules that replicate 
contracting terms between two parties and substantially lower transaction costs.” ). 
 197. Merges, supra note 175, at 1295.  Collective agencies automatically emerge to break a 
transactional bottleneck in an industry.  Id. 
 198. See id.; May, supra note 160, at 28.  Publication Rights Clearinghouse members typically 
get from seventy-five percent to ninety percent of the fees paid to the CRO.  Id. 
 199. Merges, supra note 175, at 1295-96.  CRO’s have two distinct advantages over 
compulsory licensing by the state.  Id. at 1295.  First, CRO’s provide “expert tailoring” whereby 
knowledgeable industry participants set the rules of exchange.  Id.  Compulsory licenses, on the 
other hand, are uniform and limited in scope by the statute.  Id.  A CRO’s ability to tailor its 
contracts provides an “intermediate level of contract detail, reflecting not only collective industry 
expertise but also the need for efficiency in carrying out a high volume of transactions.”  Id. at 1296.  
The CRO’s allows the contracts to be both flexible and efficient.  Id.  A CRO’s second advantage is 
the ability to be flexible itself, unlike a set in stone statutory compulsory licensing scheme.  Id.  If 
rates need to be adjusted, a CRO can easily make the needed changes.  Id.  On the other hand, a 
compulsory licensing system is subject to “legislative lock-in” where Congress is slow to react to 
needed changes, and interested parties can influence Congress not to make the changes.  Id. at 1296.  
Last, CRO’s allow individual rights holders, rather than the state, to set the standard terms of the 
licensing agreements.  Id. at 1297. 
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licensing scheme.200  First, a CRO must get authors to enroll, which is 
becoming easier as freelance authors “realize that without joint action no 
compensation would be forthcoming at all.”201  Second, and perhaps 
more difficult, is getting publishers to work with CRO’s.202  As noted 
earlier, publishers are free to condition initial publication on an express 
transfer of electronic rights, thus negating a need to pay a fee to a CRO 
for secondary rights.203 
Although some publishers have resorted to these guerilla tactics, 
other publishers have conceded to the author’s rights, and have begun 
bargaining with the Publication Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) a new CRO 
aimed at marketing freelance works of authorship.204  Hopefully the 
ruling in Tasini will encourage more and more authors to join the PRC, 
leaving publishers no choice but to deal with the PRC to get content for 
their collective works.205 
                                                                                                                                 
 200. May, supra note 160, at 28.  “In order to succeed, the PRC must enroll as many freelance 
writers as possible and persuade publishers and databases to comply with its licensing scheme.”  Id.  
The PRC has signed a deal with Contentville, a large online database, but the PRC, or other CRO’s 
must get widespread acceptance before it truly becomes effective.  See id. 
 201. See Merges, supra note 175, at 1293 (arguing that Collective Rights Organizations are the 
solution to the conflict between copyright and new technologies). 
 202. May, supra note 160, at 28.  “While these royalty-distributing organizations may provide 
part of the solution to using copyright effectively in forwarding the interests of authors, publishers, 
and users, they will not accomplish this goal unless authors retain the electronic rights to their 
works.” Atteritano, supra note 5, at 408.  If the authors sign their rights over to the publishers, the 
publishers will have no incentive to negotiate or work with a CRO because they already own the 
electronic rights.  Id.  Authors are advised to contract for electronic rights compensation, or to retain 
their electronic rights despite the “all-rights grab” by the publishers.  Id.  If the authors stick 
together, copyright protection itself will “serve to help balance the unequal bargaining positions of 
the publisher and the freelance author.”  Ryan J. Swingle, Note: Tasini v. New York Times: The 
Problem of Unauthorized Secondary Usage of an Author’s Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 621 
(1998). 
 203. Freeman, supra note 141, at 876 (commenting that modern publishers routinely require 
express transfers of copyright from freelance authors).  Many commentators think freelance authors 
will be forced to give up their electronic rights because of the publisher’s dominant negotiating 
position.  See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 6, at 154-55; Hoff, supra note 50, at 165; Meitus, supra note 
10, at 752; Forhan, supra note 144, at 863 (comparing the current U.S. approach to that of Great 
Britain; and concluding the issue will likely be solved by the industry through contracts, rather than 
by Congress or the courts, and authors will likely bargain away their rights in order to get 
published). 
 204. See Sims, supra note 53, at 13-14.  Some “publishers have begun requiring writers to 
transfer electronic rights in the signed writings as a condition to first publication, and databases are 
seeking to obtain similar express transfers.”  See supra note 203. 
 205. See Meitus, supra note 10, at 775-76.  As a result of the Supreme Court’s pro-author 
holding, most authors will undoubtedly affiliate with the PRC or a similar organization.  Id.  The 
PRC has already paid out thousands of dollars in royalty payments to its member authors.  Id.  The 
Court’s holding gives freelance authors greater leverage in getting publishers to abide by the PRC’s 
licensing scheme, under the author’s terms.  Id.  See also, May, supra note 160, at 28 (discussing 
merits of authors using Collective Rights Organizations). 
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3.  Compulsory Licensing 
If authors and publishers do not embrace the PRC, and if the 
inefficiencies of individual contracting encumber the development of 
electronic media, Congress may step in and enact a compulsory 
licensing scheme.206  Compulsory licensing statutorily requires a 
copyright owner to grant a license at an established rate.207  As a result, 
publishers can use any work they want in their collective database so 
long as they are willing to pay the statutory fee.208  On the other side, 
authors are guaranteed at least some compensation for the use of their 
work.209 
At first glance, compulsory licensing seems to be a viable solution 
for the transfer of electronic rights, but it is subject to many criticisms.210  
First, there is no clear way to devise a fair pricing schedule for literary 
works.211  Second, authors inherently lose control over reproduction and 
                                                                                                                                 
 206. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (setting forth compulsory licensing scheme for the music industry); 
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213, 1265 (1997); 
Merges, supra note 175, at 1295. 
 207. Corey Field, New Uses and New Percentages: Music Contracts, Royalties, and 
Distribution Models in the Digital Millennium, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 289, 295 (2000).  
Compulsory licensing is legislation with a statutory mandate that the rights be licensed to all comers 
willing to pay the pre-set price.  Merges, supra note 175, at 1295.  Legislatively mandated licensing  
reduces transaction costs in two ways.  Id.  First, contract terms are predetermined thus reducing and 
even eliminating haggling.  Id.  Second, compulsory licensing may have built in administrative 
support that saves parties the cost of record keeping, payment collection, and royalty disbursement.  
Id. 
 208. See Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1264.  Collective authors face two main obstacles when 
trying to get permission to use an underlying work.  Id.  First, the collective author must get the 
original author’s permission to use the work.  Id.  Second, the collective author must have sufficient 
resources and money to contact the other author, negotiate with the other author, and pay money to 
the other author for a license.  Id.  Compulsory licensing gets rid of the permission obstacle by 
statutory mandate, and alleviates the money problem because reducing the transactional costs 
associated with negotiating a license.  Id. 
 209. See Merges, supra note 175, at 1295.  Although the rights must be licensed to a publisher, 
the publisher must pay the pre-set rate.  Id.  Then the organization or system pays the authors 
royalties for the use of their works.  Id. 
 210. See infra text.  Compulsory licenses appear to be a compromise that reduces the 
transactional costs of licensing intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic 
advantages that accompany stronger rights.  Merges, supra note 175, at 1293.  However, rather than 
institute a slow government run licensing system, experience in other industries has shown that 
participants will  establish more efficient private collective rights organizations.  Id. at 1295.  
Current evidence is already showing that this is happening with the establishment of the Author’s 
Registry and the Publication Rights Clearinghouse.  See id. 
 211. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1264.  A statutory fee based on the amount of data taken, 
priced out per “bit”,  seems fair for an information database because the amount taken directly 
correlates to the value of the appropriated information.  Id.  However, the volume or amount taken 
does not accurately represent the value of literary and artistic works.  Id.  Some of the world’s most 
valuable literary works, Keats’ Ode on a Grecian Urn for example, are worth substantially more 
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distribution, both exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.212  Third, a 
compulsory licensing scheme for electronic rights would require an 
effective method of monitoring file transfers.213  This file monitoring 
system, combined with an effective pay-per-use system, could be used to 
charge the public for simply browsing Internet websites.214  Lastly, 
compulsory licensing may decrease the scope of “fair use” on the 
Internet by creating an identifiable market for a copyrighted work, 
therefore turning the last fair use factor against someone previously 
making a fair use of a copyrighted work.215 
Although each of the models set forth contain flaws, the system the 
parties adopt will inevitably be calculated to promote the public welfare 
because the parties adequately represent the competing goals of 
copyright law.216  The publishers strenuously advocate expanding their 
                                                                                                                                 
than a horribly written 700-page novel by an unknown author.  See id. 
 212. See Saez, supra note 186, at 351.  A compulsory licensing scheme would be enacted as an 
amendment to the Copyright Act, thus making an exception to the author’s exclusive rights.  See, 
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are 
limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3), and (6) of section 106, and do not include any 
right of performance under section 106(4)”).  However, “if every time we can no longer enforce the 
exclusive nature of a right. . . if every time we react by creating a remuneration right only, we are 
gradually pushing copyright away from its nature as a fundamental right into a type of taxation 
system. . . [and] if this continues without reaction, copyright will be dead in 30 years.”  Saez, supra 
note 186, citing Janet Ibbotson & Nainah Shah, Interactive Multimedia and Electronic Publishing, 
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Oct. 1993, at 32. 
 213. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1265.  Computers are well suited for tracking a work’s use.  
Shuff, supra note 8, at 569.  Copy protection mechanisms, like those for digital music, could be 
imbedded in electronic works to thwart unlawful copying, or to track use.  Id.  After the work had 
been used, a system could solicit an appropriate fee form the user and compensate the author.  Id.  
Clearinghouse of individual works may created that includes terms for secondary distribution of a 
work as well as automatic billing and collection of licensing fees to be paid to the author.  Id. 
 214. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1265. 
 215. Id., citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding copying of professional journals was not fair use in light of ready market created by 
Copyright Clearance Center for remunerating copyright owners for photocopies of their works).  
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing four factors that determine fair use as: “(1) the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”). 
 216. See Dixon, supra note 6, at 144 n.54 (stating copyright law balances an incentive for the 
creation of works with ensuring the public and later creators can enjoy and build on those works); 
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (demonstrating publishers and authors fighting 
for electronic rights).  The balance of author against publisher is analogous to copyright’s balance of 
promoting creation through incentives, and promoting free access to copyrighted works.  Ryan J. 
Swingle, Note: Tasini v. New York Times: The Problem of Unauthorized Secondary Usage of an 
Author’s Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 612-13 (1998).  Having competing viewpoints protects 
society against “two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed 
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward 
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rights to give the public more access to copyrighted works.217  The 
authors strenuously advocate expanding their rights to establish 
incentives to create new works.218 
                                                                                                                                 
of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of the improvements, 
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.”  Id., citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151,  156 (1975). 
 217. Brief for Petitioners at 2001 WL 27573, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing Congress intended publishers to be able to make their publications 
and “any revisions” available to the public; electronic copies are privileged under § 201(c) because 
legislative history confirms the breadth of the clause; and reading § 201(c) so as to prevent 
electronic publication conflicts with the basic tenets of copyright law, to promote general welfare 
through dissemination); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2001 WL 267401, New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing electronic copies are revisions of their collective 
works because they publish the entire editorial content of the original work; therefore the media 
neutral Copyright laws should allow the transfer of works to digital form under the same license); 
see also, Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 22914, New York 
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing removal of freelance articles from 
internet would be devastating to the electronic record and impede public access to valuable 
information); Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Burns et al. at 2001 WL 23641, New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that a finding in favor of authors will both 
threaten the completeness of the electronic archives and decrease access to convenient and cost 
efficient means of comprehensive research; that the focus on end users in determining whether 
electronic archives qualify as “revisions” under § 201(c) is inconsistent with the practical realities 
inherent in the process of research, as well as the longstanding publishing industry assumptions 
regarding the permissibility of traditional analog means of periodical, newspaper, or journal storage 
and retrieval); Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Geographic Society at 2001 WL 27568, New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing publisher of printed 
collective work is entitled to reproduce and distribute that collective work in any medium (or 
combination of media) it chooses); Brief of Amici Curiae Software & Information Industry 
Association et al. at 2001 WL 27570, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-
201) (arguing legislative history does not support Second Circuits interpretation of § 201(c), and 
differences between the databases and the original print publications are immaterial as a matter of 
law because of media neutrality, because the differences are no different than a printed revision, and 
because selection of articles is protected independently from arrangement; arguing it is immaterial 
how a third party can search through the materials because this is direct infringement case). 
 218. Respondent’s Brief at 2001 WL 174956, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing § 201(c)’s plain meaning confines scope of publisher’s privilege to 
revisions in the same series, not new collective works; that the legislative history supports this plain 
meaning; and that narrowly reading § 201(c) to not allow electronic publishing of freelance articles 
in databases is consistent with precedent and copyright policy); Brief for Respondents Tasini, 
Blakely, Mifflin & Whitford at 2001 WL 177049, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that § 201(c)’s language and legislative history justify a finding that 
newspaper publisher’s electronic publishing of freelance articles exceeds the scope of the § 201(c) 
privilege); see also,  Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Assoc. & Assoc. of Research 
Libraries at 2001 WL 173550, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) 
(arguing Copyright Act does not require deletion of works from electronic databases and/or 
destruction of CD-ROMs; rather the courts can require payment of fair compensation to authors in 
the form of past and continuing royalties while maintaining public access); Brief of Amici Curiae 
American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 177046, New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing legislative history of § 201(c) shows it was 
intended to protect authors’ copyrights in contributions to collective works and to grant publishers 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Tasini confirmed Marshall McLuhan’s hypothesis that the medium 
is the message.219  Digital technology is going to define the future of our 
society and the future of copyright law.220  As technology burgeons, it 
will become more common to see entrepreneurs exploiting new 
technologies, and authors getting angry because these entrepreneurs are 
not sharing the profits from the use of the author’s works.221  Now that 
the Supreme Court has ruled that absent an express transfer, authors 
retain the electronic rights to their works, both authors and publishers 
must decide how they will interact, and how they will transfer new 
electronic rights.222  Although each side will be acting in their own self 
interest, the system they adopt will inevitably be calculated to achieve 
                                                                                                                                 
limited rights in those contributions; and that consequences of removing works or requiring 
payment of royalties will not be devastating); Brief of Amici Curiae Authors Guild, Inc. et al. at 
2001 WL 177047, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing 
Second Circuit properly weighed the interests of authors, publishers, researchers and electronic 
databases in finding publishers could not place articles in electronic databases without 
authorization); Brief of Amici Curiae Ellen Schrecker et al. at 2001 WL 177048, New York Times 
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing historians do not need commercial 
electronic databases to research, and copyrights of freelance writers should not be ignored simply to 
solve the unrelated problem of neglect of the nation’s archives); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
International Federation of Journalists at 2001 WL 173557, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing foreign courts have consistently recognized an author has a 
continuing copyright in the electronic publication of her work even though she has agreed to include 
her work in a printed collective work, the U.S. Copyright laws should be construed in conformity 
with similarly minded laws of other nations unless Congress has dictated otherwise, and the 
European experience teaches that ruling in favor of the authors’ electronic rights does not result n 
the withdrawal of literary works from the Internet). 
 219. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see MCLUHAN, supra note 3; Dixon, supra note 6, at 155 n.113 
(“the impact of the explosive growth of Cyberspace is difficult to exaggerate”).  “There are people 
who believe that the computer revolution of this decade represents a fundamental change in society, 
one that will rank alongside the great social movements in history.”  Dixon, supra note 6, at 155 
n.113, citing Paul Keegan, The Digerati!, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 1995, at 38. 
 220. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
1395 (1996) (arguing that digital technologies will expand and redefine the scope of copyright law); 
Elina Mangassarian, Technological Trends and the Changing Face of International Intellectual 
Property Law,  INT’L LEGAL PERSP. (2001); Jacqeline Lipton, Copyright in the Digital Age: A 
Comparative Survey, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER  TECH L.J. 333 (2001); Liz Robinson, Music on the 
Internet: An International Copyright Dilemma, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 183 (2000); Michael J. 
O’Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright Holders in the Internet Age, 13 N.Y. 
INT’L L. REV. 1 (2000); Charles S. Sims, Understanding Tasini: The Litigation and its Impact on 
New Media Licensing, 601 PLI / PAT 401 (2000) (arguing the basic assumptions of publishers and 
freelancers have changed after Tasini, and the industry has to adapt to the evolving “online society” 
by recognizing and compensating for newly arising issues). 
 221. Saez, supra note 186, at 366. 
 222. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see Santelli, supra note 21, at 278; Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 
148; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405; Sims, supra note 53, at 410; Forhan, supra note 144, at 883; 
Hur, supra note 35, at 90 n.258; Dixon, supra note 6, at 153 n.104. 
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the ultimate goal of copyright: to promote the public welfare through 
both incentives to create new works, and public access to these new 
works.223 
Mark B. Radefeld 
                                                                                                                                 
 223. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 409.  “No solution will satisfy everyone, but if we use the 
copyright institutions which already exist to assist in the transition which the publishing industry 
must make, and if authors are reasonable in their financial demands, all three parties to copyright 
(authors, publishers and users) will enjoy a second helping of the growing financial pie created by 
electronic publishing.”  Id. 
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